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REASONED EXPLANATION AND  
IRS ADJUDICATION 
STEVE R. JOHNSON† 
ABSTRACT 
  Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an administrative 
action can be invalidated as arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
fails to sufficiently explain the reasons for its choices. This principle 
applies to agency adjudication as well as to agency rulemaking. How 
does this principle apply to IRS adjudications? Examining five 
paradigms of IRS decisionmaking, this Article first establishes that the 
IRS does engage in APA–style adjudication. The Article then 
examines tax-specific explanation requirements and asks whether a 
more robust explanation duty patterned on the APA should be 
imposed on IRS determinations. Based on a variety of legal and 
prudential considerations, the Article concludes that such an 
additional duty generally is not advisable as to IRS assessment 
determinations (that is, the amount of tax liability owed) but may be 
useful as to IRS collection determinations (that is, when and how to 
proceed with enforced collection after assessment). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Administrative Procedure Act1 (APA) clearly applies to the 
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).2 
Nonetheless, for generations, tax lawyers and administrators were 
slow to acknowledge the applicability of general administrative law to 
tax. Their attitudes toward this applicability (or intrusion, as some 
viewed it) ranged from outright denunciation to guerilla warfare to 
(most commonly) neglect, indifference, and disregard.3 
Those days are gone. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court 
and lower federal courts have made it undeniable that administrative 
law applies to tax.4 Tax lawyers and administrators are being 
dragged—some kicking and screaming, some in grudging 
resignation—into this realization. 
To say that administrative law applies to tax, however, leaves 
open important questions as to just how it applies in particular 
circumstances. Administrative law is about nuance, and it must be 
adapted to the issues, agencies, and circumstances of the particular 
situation at hand.5 “[T]he intensity of the court’s supervisory role 
 
 1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 2. See id. § 551(1) (defining “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United 
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency,” subject to some 
exceptions not relevant here); Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., 
dissenting) (“I begin by stating the obvious: the IRS is an ‘agency’ as defined by the APA, the 
IRS has made findings of fact in this case, and such findings constitute ‘agency action.’”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT 9–10 (1947) (explaining the APA’s definition of the word “agency”). 
 3. For decades, occasional (and not always very good) discussions of administrative-law 
issues have popped up in tax decisions, but they have typically made only fleeting impressions in 
tax lawyers’ minds. See, e.g., Redhouse v. Comm’r, 728 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1984); Am. 
Med. Ass’n v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 358, 363–66 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 
887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989); Nat’l Rest. Ass’n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 933, 999 (D.D.C. 1976); 
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 895 (D.D.C. 1974); Estate of Gardner v. 
Comm’r, 82 T.C. 989, 994 (1984); Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 27–32 (1983); Wendland v. 
Comm’r, 79 T.C. 355, 379–82 (1982); Dittler Bros. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 896, 909 (1979), aff’d, 642 
F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 4. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712–
14 (2011); Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Intermountain Ins. of 
Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 236–48 (2010) (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring in the 
result), rev’d, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012). For a discussion of 
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), see 
generally Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. 
TAX REV. 269 (2012). 
 5. Cf., e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527–33 (2004) (displaying sensitivity to 
context in applying administrative law to military operations); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 
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[over agencies] varies with context.”6 This reality pervades 
administrative law generally,7 including the celebrated, yet 
challenging, arbitrary-and-capricious standard.8 Part of the challenge 
of “Taking Administrative Law to Tax” is the cultural difference 
between this fluidity of administrative law and the relatively greater 
determinacy of tax.9 
This Article involves one of these second-generation issues. 
General administrative law, through the arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard, insists that agencies give reasoned explanations for their 
actions. This requirement “has come to play a central role in judicial 
review of agency decisions.”10 How should it apply in the tax context? 
Administrative-law authority and commentary—conveniently, 
though somewhat imprecisely—train principal attention on agencies’ 
quasi-legislation through promulgation of regulations and agencies’ 
 
482–83 (1995) (to prison administration); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (to 
revenue raising). 
 6. Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 817 (2008). 
 7. As Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman have observed, 
[A]dministrative law doctrine necessarily reflects the interaction between agency-
specific law . . . and generally applicable law, such as the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). . . . [A]gencies have differing organic statutes and administer different 
regulatory and benefit programs, so some degree of variation is implicit in 
administrative law doctrine. . . . [Indeed,] the universality of administrative law 
doctrine may not be as pervasive as is commonly assumed. 
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 500 
(2011); see also Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right 
Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1161 (2004) (“[T]he extent of external constraints on agency 
discretion generally varies with the nature of the decision and the type of interest 
involved . . . .”); Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or 
Deliberate Strategy, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 89 (2011) (“Given the diversity of 
organizational structures, practices, and goals among federal government agencies, is there or 
should there be a body of general principles labeled administrative law?”). 
 8. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 821 (“‘Arbitrary [or] capricious’ has one meaning for a 
court reviewing congressional judgments in enacting legislation, another for a court reviewing 
an agency’s decision to adopt a high-consequence regulation, another for a court reviewing an 
agency’s judgment to forego rulemaking it has been petitioned to undertake, and another for 
review of the products of informal adjudications in relatively low-consequence matters . . . .” 
(first alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 9. Cf. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Administrative Procedure Act is not the tax code. [Administrative-law] 
cases . . . provide rules of thumb, general principles meant to guide interpretation, not rigid rules 
that narrowly confine it.”). 
 10. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 387, 388. 
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quasi-adjudication through decisions in particular cases.11 This Article 
focuses on the reasoned-explanation requirement as applied to tax 
adjudication by the IRS.12 It is the first to address the reasoned-
explanation requirement across multiple dimensions of IRS 
adjudication. 
The iconic dimension of IRS adjudication involves the IRS’s 
issuance of a notice of deficiency, which usually is a prerequisite to its 
assessment of deficiencies of income, estate, and gift taxes.13 The 
traditional, strongly asserted view is that APA–style, reasoned-
explanation review is unavailable for notices of deficiency.14 But the 
seminal cases standing for this position were decided before the 
enactment of the APA, and more recent cases have not reexamined 
IRS adjudication in light of the APA. Commentators have argued 
that the reasoned-explanation requirement should attach to IRS 
deficiency determinations, either broadly or narrowly.15 Moreover, a 
number of circuit court and Tax Court judges have recently 
maintained in dissents that an APA analysis is appropriate in at least 
some deficiency or deficiency-related cases.16 
Beyond deficiency determinations, there are other types of IRS 
adjudications. They include jeopardy- and termination-assessment 
 
 11. “[T]he entire [APA] is based upon a dichotomy between rule making and 
adjudication.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 14. 
 12. A later article of mine will examine the requirement as applied to tax regulations 
promulgated by the Treasury Department. See, e.g., Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 
F.3d 1313, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (invalidating on APA grounds a regulation as to the 
capitalization of interest expenses); Mannella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 115, 127–30 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (urging the invalidation of a regulation limiting spousal relief, in part 
because of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard). 
 13. See I.R.C. § 6211–6213 (2012). 
 14. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 15. Professor Kenneth Davis once asked rhetorically, “[W]hen the IRS Appellate Division 
decides a question against a taxpayer, why is it not required to provide a reasoned opinion, 
including systematic findings of fact?” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 12.13, at 462 (2d ed. 1979); see also Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Reasoned-
Explanation Rule and IRS Deficiency Notices, 134 TAX NOTES 331, 331 (2012) (arguing that the 
reasoned-explanation requirement should apply to notices of deficiency generally); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service To Be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 
411, 411 (1985) (maintaining that the IRS should have a duty—borrowed from administrative 
law—to explain or to repudiate, or lose when it asserts seemingly inconsistent deficiency and 
other adjustments). 
 16. E.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 996–99 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting); 
Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1278–87 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); Ewing v. 
Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 61 (2004) (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting), rev’d on other grounds, 
439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). These cases involved equitable spousal relief under I.R.C. 
§ 6015(f). 
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determinations, collection due process (CDP) determinations, trust 
fund recovery determinations, and others.17 Courts have cited key 
reasoned-explanation precedents, such as Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I),18 in several cases involving 
these types of determinations.19 On many occasions, courts have 
invalidated or remanded IRS determinations because of inadequate 
explanations, although they have not specified whether they located 
the explanation duty within or outside of the APA.20 In addition, 
courts have applied APA judicial-review standards that differ from 
the reasoned-explanation standard in cases involving IRS 
adjudication, especially CDP determinations.21 
Yet the waters are murky. Many cases stand in opposition to the 
above decisions.22 In some dimensions of IRS adjudication, little 
authority as to explanation exists. Moreover, it is unclear to what 
extent the various dimensions of IRS adjudication are comparable. 
This Article seeks to advance the understanding of this important yet 
understudied area. 
The Article has five major parts. Part I describes the reasoned-
explanation requirement, addressing its statutory bases, 
consequences, justifications, costs, and also cases on point. Part II 
establishes the proposition—not universally accepted—that the IRS 
does in fact adjudicate in an administrative-law sense. It then 
develops this idea through four paradigms: deficiency and cognate 
determinations, jeopardy and termination determinations, trust fund 
recovery “penalty” determinations, and CDP determinations. Part II 
concludes by noting that other types of IRS action may also constitute 
agency adjudication. Part III demonstrates that substantial-
explanation requirements already exist as to most paradigms of IRS 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 19. See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Chenery I, 318 
U.S. 80); Salahuddin v. Comm’r, No. 7050-11L, 2012 WL 1758628, at *7 (T.C. May 17, 2012) 
(same); cf. Hirschhorn v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (invoking the 
Chenery principle but not citing the case). For a discussion of Chenery, see infra notes 46–62 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. E.g., Walker v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); Hoyle v. 
Comm’r, 131 T.C. 197, 205 (2008); see infra Parts II.B–C. 
 21. E.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459–60 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review); see also Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial 
Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 441 (2008) (“[A]dministrative law 
and its principles are applicable to most tax collection cases.”). 
 22. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
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adjudication. However, these requirements sound mostly in tax law 
rather than in administrative law, and, in their application by the 
courts, the requirements sometimes lead to different outcomes than 
might be expected under the APA–style arbitrary-and-capricious 
analysis. 
That being so, the question becomes whether tax-specific 
explanation rules should be supplemented by an APA level of 
analysis. Parts IV and V address this question. Recognizing the 
centrality of context in administrative law, this Article does not 
propose a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, Part IV maintains that 
because of a variety of prudential and legal considerations, an APA 
explanation requirement should not be grafted onto existing tax 
explanation requirements involving deficiency and cognate 
determinations. 
On similar grounds, Part V reaches the same conclusion as to 
IRS jeopardy and termination determinations, trust fund recovery 
penalty determinations, and CDP determinations as to liability. 
However, these prudential and legal considerations are absent from, 
or operate only weakly in, other contexts. Accordingly, Part V offers 
that an APA explanation requirement should be applied to CDP 
determinations involving collection—as opposed to liability—
determinations. Similarly, although detailed consideration of such 
situations is beyond the scope of this Article, in IRS adjudications 
outside the above paradigms, the case for applying an APA 
explanation requirement is likely to be stronger in collection 
situations than in liability situations. 
I.  THE REASONED-EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT 
The reasoned-explanation requirement is part of a much larger 
“struggle to devise a successful theory of judicial review of 
administrative action.” This problem “is as old as administrative law 
itself,”23 and no enduring theory has yet emerged. In fact, “[t]he 
courts have not developed a consistent approach to controlling 
agency discretion,” and “[l]acking an intelligible theoretical 
framework, the Supreme Court has oscillated between activism and 
restraint in reviewing agency decisions.”24 
 
 23. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 440. 
 24. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 
1325 (1986); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL 
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This difficulty has at least three roots. First, the doctrine reflects 
an attempt to balance the important but competing goals of 
facilitating government responses to social problems with preserving 
the traditions of limited government enshrined in our constitutional 
order.25 This balance bobs on the tides of events and rarely remains 
stable for long. 
Second, in theory, judges are supposed to supervise the 
regularity of agency decisions without “imposing on an agency the 
reviewing court’s perception of which value choices are legitimate 
and which are not.”26 But exercising such discipline can be difficult in 
practice. Thus, “the suspicion has arisen . . . that the grand 
synthesizing principle that tells us whether the court will dig deeply or 
bow cursorily depends . . . on whether the judge agrees with the result 
of the administrative decision.”27 
Third, the unsettled constitutional position of agencies further 
muddies the waters. “[T]he role and position of the agency, and the 
exact locus of its powers, present questions that are delicate, subtle, 
and complex. . . . [T]he amorphous character of the administrative 
agency in the constitutional system escapes simple explanation.”28 As 
conceptions of the constitutional place of agencies change, so do 
doctrines of judicial review of administrative action. The eras and 
dominating models of American administrative law have been 
characterized in several ways. One scholar has traced trends in 
judicial review through four successive models: agency expertise (the 
 
SECURITY CLAIMS 1 (1983) (“[T]he history of American administrative law is a history of failed 
ideas.”).  
 25. See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) (“Our recognition of 
Congress’ need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of 
governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of 
the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision . . . .”); Shapiro & Levy, 
supra note 10, at 390–96 (arguing that explanation requirements are part of the attempt to 
achieve this balance). 
 26. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 160 (2012); cf. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (“It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners, 
would have reached.”). 
 27. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision 
Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 302 (1981); see Henry 
Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 
DUKE L.J. 199, 224; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 814 (2008). 
 28. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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dominant model until the 1970s), reasoned decisionmaking (in the 
1970s), counteracting interest groups (starting in the 1980s), and 
presidential control of agencies (currently the dominant model).29 
Explanation requirements are buffeted by these shifting winds. 
Below, the Article discusses the statutory basis of the reasoned-
explanation principle, its associated case law, and the principle’s 
justifications, costs, and limits. 
A. Statutory Bases of the Requirement 
The APA was enacted in 1946.30 Some of its sections govern 
agencies; others govern judicial review of agency actions. The first 
group is not of principal significance to this Article. For example, 5 
U.S.C. § 553 contains a weak explanation requirement,31 but that 
section applies only to agency rulemaking, not adjudication. Sections 
554 through 558 establish a variety of rules, but they apply principally 
to formal adjudication and rulemaking.32 IRS adjudications are 
informal, and so are largely outside these sections.33 
In contrast, the APA provisions governing judicial review are 
pertinent here. These provisions apply “except to the extent 
that . . . (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”34 Judicial review under the 
 
 29. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, 153–58. But see Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, 396–412 
(describing structuralist, proceduralist, and rationalist models). 
 30. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)). 
 31. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose.”). 
 32. As to informal adjudications, the only applicable constraints under these sections are 
that the agency must allow the party to be represented, to obtain copies of information she 
provides, and to receive a brief statement of the grounds of denial of an application or petition. 
Id. § 555. 
 33. Formal adjudication involves proceedings that are “required by statute to be 
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” Id. § 554(a); see United 
States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973) (holding that the mere use of the word 
“hearing” in an enabling act does not trigger formal procedures); cf. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.2, at 381–86 (3d ed. 1994) 
(maintaining that the Florida East Coast result should apply to adjudications as well as to 
rulemaking). As described in Part III, the statutes governing IRS adjudications do not contain 
such language. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 171 (2001) (Halpern, J., concurring) 
(“[A] determination under section 6330(c)(3) is not a formal adjudication.”); Davis v. Comm’r, 
115 T.C. 35, 41–42 (2000) (holding that CDP determinations are informal adjudications). 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The second exception is “very narrow . . . [and only] applicable in 
those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is 
no law to apply.’” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 
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APA is available to persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected” by it35 and reaches “[a]gency action 
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate remedy in a court.”36 However, the APA does not 
confer subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts apply APA rules only if 
other statutes confer upon them jurisdiction to hear a case.37 
Under 5 U.S.C. § 706, and subject to a harmless-error rule,38 
reviewing courts may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions” for any of six reasons.39 One reason is that 
the action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”40 These terms have not been 
given separate meaning. They are understood to provide a single 
standard, known as the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.41 This 
standard is not limited to formal adjudication or rulemaking. The 
statutory text is broader, reaching agency “action, findings, and 
conclusions,” and the case law establishes that the standard applies to 
review of all kinds of agency actions, including adjudications.42 
Neither the text of § 706 nor its legislative history clarifies the 
contents of this standard or how stringently it is to be applied.43 As 
 
26 (1945)). Nonetheless, this exception sometimes has operated in tax cases. For instance, the 
IRS has authority to abate liability for interest under some circumstances. I.R.C. § 6404(e). 
Before amendment of the statute to provide for judicial review, cases held that interest-
abatement decisions were committed to the discretion of the IRS, and thus, courts were 
precluded by the APA exception from hearing taxpayer challenges to IRS decisions not to abate 
interest. E.g., Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 473 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 36. Id. § 704. 
 37. E.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–07 (1977). 
 38. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”); see 
also, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (applying a statute with the same 
wording as 5 U.S.C. § 706 to require the “Veterans Court to apply the same kind of ‘harmless 
error’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases”). See generally Craig Smith, Note, Taking 
“Due Account” of the APA’s Prejudicial-Error Rule, 96 VA. L. REV. 1727 (2010). 
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 40. Id. § 706(2)(A). The other bases are that the agency action was contrary to 
constitutional rights, in excess of the agency’s statutory authority, inconsistent with procedures 
required by law, unsupported by substantial evidence (if there is a formal record), or 
unwarranted by the facts (if subject to trial de novo). Id. §§ 706(2)(B)–(F). 
 41. E.g., Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 563 (5th Cir. 1999); Salahuddin v. Comm’r, No. 
7050-11L, 2012 WL 1758628, at *6 (T.C. May 17, 2012). 
 42. E.g., Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1971); see 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.4, at 1022 (5th ed. 2010); 
Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 144 n.15. 
 43. See Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 
1910 (2009). 
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shown below, explanation requirements and other aspects of 
arbitrary-and-capricious review predated enactment of the APA, and 
the stringency of their application by courts has varied over time. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that the APA’s reasoned-explanation 
requirement applies to IRS adjudication, it applies by virtue of § 706. 
B. Judicial Evolution of the Requirement 
1. Pre–APA Cases.  The roots of the reasoned-explanation 
requirement extend back generations before 1946. The earliest cases 
involved agency adjudication, not rulemaking. In these cases, courts 
instructed agencies to state the reasons and factual findings on which 
their orders were based.44 This approach was not followed 
consistently, however.45 
The key case of the early period is the Supreme Court’s 1943 
Chenery decision.46 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issued an order prohibiting officers and directors of a public utility 
holding company from buying stock during reorganization.47 The SEC 
based this order on its understanding of fiduciary law.48 The Court 
intimated that the SEC had the authority to issue the order under a 
different theory, but that the SEC was wrong in its view of fiduciary 
law.49 It invalidated the order and remanded, holding that “an 
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which 
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its 
action can be sustained.”50 On remand, the SEC issued the same 
order, but based it on the alternative ground suggested by the Court 
in Chenery I.51 The Court in Securities & Exchange Commission v. 
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II)52 upheld the new order.53 Chenery I is 
 
 44. E.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 58–59 (1922); Am. 
Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617, 625–26 (1917). 
 45. See, e.g., Beaumont, Sour Lake & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74, 86–87 
(1930) (upholding an order despite the agency’s failure to state the facts and reasoning behind 
it). 
 46. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).  
 47. Id. at 81. 
 48. Id. at 85. 
 49. Id. at 85–88. 
 50. Id. at 95. For further discussion of Chenery I, see generally Kevin M. Stack, The 
Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L. J. 952 (2007). 
 51. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947). 
 52. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 53. Id. at 209. 
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understood to mean that the propriety of an agency’s action must be 
evaluated on the basis of the reason(s) the agency articulated at the 
time, not on the basis of reasons developed later, even if they could 
have sufficed had they been advanced earlier.54 
The Chenery cases are often thought to sound in the separation 
of powers. The Supreme Court explained that a court “is powerless to 
affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be 
a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court 
into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the 
administrative agency.”55 
Instrumental concerns are also at play. A position advanced by 
an agency’s lawyer on brief or in argument may not reflect the 
agency’s special expertise. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the 
persuasive rationale appears for the first time in a legal brief does not 
categorically “make it unworthy of deference” if, under the 
circumstances at hand, it appears that the interpretation still reflects 
“the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question.”56 Similarly, post hoc rationales may be unobjectionable in 
situations in which “no special agency expertise is involved.”57 
The Chenery I principle has been called “well established,”58 
“elementary,”59 and “black-letter law.”60 Nonetheless, as seen above, 
there are exceptions. Sometimes the principle is just ignored.61 Other 
 
 54. E.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). 
 55. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196; see also Atlixco Coal. v. Maggiore, 965 P.2d 370, 377 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that “is not consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers” for 
reviewing courts to supply reasons for administrative actions when the legislature directs an 
agency to do so). 
 56. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). For further discussion of Auer, see generally 
Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1 
(2013). 
 57. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977, 981 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see Am. Farm 
Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 58. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). 
 59. Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 984 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 60. Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 545 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 61. For example, in one case the EPA changed its justification for a decision while the 
litigation was in progress. The Ninth Circuit held the EPA’s reliance on its new interpretation to 
be arbitrary and capricious. By five to four, however, the Supreme Court upheld the agency’s 
actions. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007). But see 
id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of ignoring Chenery I’s “hoary principle 
of administrative law and substitut[ing] a post-hoc interpretation . . . for that of the relevant 
agency”). 
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times, the new position is accorded lesser deference rather than being 
entirely excluded from consideration.62 
2. Post–APA Cases.  Arbitrariness review was highly deferential 
for several decades after the enactment of the APA.63 This changed as 
New Deal enthusiasm gave way to post–World War II 
disenchantment with the performance of agencies and as fears grew 
of agencies being captured by the industries they were supposed to 
regulate.64 As a result, courts developed a hard-look approach to 
arbitrary-and-capricious review. The Supreme Court’s 1971 decision 
in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe65 was significant in this 
movement. 
At issue in Overton Park was legislation providing that the U.S. 
Department of Transportation could expend federal funds on roads 
through public parks only if no “feasible and prudent alternative” 
existed and only after “all possible planning to minimize harm” to the 
park.66 The Department approved such use of federal funds without 
factual findings as to these predicates.67 
The lower courts upheld the Department’s decision on the basis 
of litigation affidavits presented by the Department.68 The Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for the development of a more 
thorough record.69 Invoking Chenery I, the Court found the affidavits 
to be “merely ‘post hoc’ rationalizations”70 insufficient to allow the 
courts to fulfill their duty to ascertain whether the Department had 
been faithful to the statutes and whether its decision passed arbitrary-
and-capricious muster. In a remarkable display of double-talk, the 
Court instructed that the scope of review is “narrow,” yet the review 
 
 62. E.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 144 (1984); see Richard 
Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the Duty To Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 817, 821–22 (2012) (noting how “[c]ourts, confronted by Chenery’s overreach, find ways 
around it”). 
 63. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 454 (1986); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (1987). 
 64. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039, 1056 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the 
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1555 (1992). 
 65. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 66. See id. at 405 (quoting Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) 
(Supp. V 1964); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V 1964)). 
 67. Id. at 408. 
 68. Id. at 409. 
 69. Id. at 420. 
 70. Id. at 419. 
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is to be “searching and careful,”71 and that the agency “is entitled to a 
presumption of regularity,” but the presumption does not shield the 
agency’s decision “from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.”72 
The next milestone was the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in 
Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.73 After President Ronald Reagan succeeded President 
Jimmy Carter, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
revoked regulations that would have required manufacturers to install 
either automatic seatbelts or airbags in their cars.74 The Court 
unanimously found that the agency had failed to consider plausible 
alternatives, had improperly weighed costs and benefits, and had 
“failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding 
the passive restraint requirement,” rendering the decision arbitrary 
and capricious.75 In so doing, the Court delivered the most frequently 
quoted summary of the elements of arbitrary-and-capricious review. 
Specifically, 
An agency[’s] [action] would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.76 
To this partial enumeration may be added two matters that make 
the explanation reasoned. The first involves the detail and 
specification (or lack thereof) of the agency’s prelitigation 
explanation. The Court in State Farm noted that an agency must 
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action . . . . [It] must 
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given 
 
 71. Id. at 416. 
 72. Id. at 415. 
 73. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 74. Id. at 36–37. 
 75. Id. at 34. 
 76. Id. at 43. It is unclear whether State Farm has meaningfully altered the rate at which 
courts invalidate agency decisions. The most recent scholarship suggests that the reversal rate 
under State Farm is about the same as reversal rates under most other major standards of review 
used in administrative law. Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2011). See 
generally David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010). 
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manner.”77 As hard-look review evolved, “the courts demanded 
increasingly detailed explanations of the agency’s rationale; they 
required specification of the agency’s policy premises, its reasoning, 
and its factual support.”78 The second involves considering and 
responding to comments and possible weaknesses in the agency’s 
analysis. Hard-look review is meant “to ensure that agencies disclose 
relevant data and provide reasoned responses to material objections 
raised during the rulemaking process.”79 
In the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc.,80 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) held 
that a change in agency position imposed no heightened duty of 
explanation. Prior to 2009, the FCC made its indecency policy stricter 
to reflect its reinterpretation of the constraints of First Amendment 
case law upon its enforcement power.81 It then issued notices of 
apparent liability against a television station for indecent broadcasts.82 
A sharply divided Supreme Court rejected an arbitrary-and-
capricious challenge to the new policy.83 The Fox majority first 
rehearsed general principles. It noted that the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard was “narrow,” that a court should not substitute 
its policy judgment for that of the agency, and that an agency 
explanation “of less than ideal clarity” should nonetheless be upheld 
“if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”84 The majority 
then held that there was “no basis” in either the APA or State Farm 
“for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more 
searching review.”85 Further, the majority held: 
[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for 
its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is 
changing position. . . . And of course the agency must show that 
there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not [always] 
demonstrate . . . that the reasons for the new policy are better than 
 
 77. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 48–49. 
 78. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 526 
(1985). 
 79. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 (2009); see Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 155. 
 80. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 81. Id. at 507–08.  
 82. Id. at 510. 
 83. Id. at 530. 
 84. Id. at 513–14.  
 85. Id. at 514. 
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the reasons for the old one . . . . Sometimes it must—when, for 
example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict 
those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into 
account.86 
In short, the leading cases teach us that there is a reasoned-
explanation requirement. That requirement applies to all agencies 
and to all final agency actions (adjudication as well as rulemaking). 
However, there is no formula for how much explanation is enough. 
The sufficiency of the explanation depends on the circumstances. 
C. Remedying Violations of the Reasoned-Explanation Requirement 
When an agency fails to satisfy the reasoned-explanation 
requirement, the usual consequence is remand to the agency.87 What 
happens then depends upon the nature and complexity of the matter. 
Professors Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy have outlined three 
possible scenarios: 
First, there may be an easily remedied flaw in the agency’s logic or 
gap in its reasoning process. In such a case, the agency on remand 
need not engage in any additional procedures to correct this flaw. 
Second, an agency may be required to provide additional factual 
support for its decision, which might lead to additional proceedings 
pursuant to the APA. Finally, in rare cases the agency may be 
unable to elicit adequate support for its reasoning without engaging 
in some form of hybrid procedures.88 
When regulations are concerned, remand usually delays, rather 
than prevents, the action the agency wants to take. One study found 
that agencies “successfully implemented their policies in 
approximately 80% of the instances in which courts have originally 
remanded rules as arbitrary and capricious,” and that the average 
 
 86. Id. at 515 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)). Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the reasons given by the FCC “[were] not so precise, detailed, or 
elaborated as to be a model for agency explanation” but sufficed. Id. at 538 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Four dissenting Justices would have 
imposed a higher burden of explanation when agencies change positions and would have 
invalidated the new policy because the FCC failed “at least minimally” to consider two allegedly 
important issues. Id. at 546, 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 87. E.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v. FAA, 254 F.3d 271, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated, 276 
F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2001); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 88. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 435 (footnotes omitted). 
JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:15 AM 
2014] REASONED EXPLANATION 1787 
delay between remand and recovery was about two years.89 The 
extent to which remand can and should be used in the context of tax 
regulations has not been tested in the courts and is in dispute among 
commentators.90 
The effects outside of the rulemaking context have not been 
studied systematically. Chenery I did not significantly impair the 
SEC’s ability to impose its orders.91 However, Overton Park—which 
invoked the now disfavored92approach of remand to the trial court, 
not the agency93—caused the Department of Transportation to 
abandon its decision to fund the project.94 
D. Justifications for the Requirement 
“The practice of providing reasons for decisions has long been 
considered an essential aspect of legal culture.”95 Numerous 
justifications have been adduced for the reasoned-explanation 
requirement and for the larger arbitrary-and-capricious review of 
which it is a part. The justifications fall into three main categories: 
constitutional considerations, political-process considerations, and 
decisional-quality considerations. Some of the justifications apply 
with different force in the rulemaking versus the adjudication context. 
Nonetheless, all are worth noting for their contribution to the 
development of the doctrine. 
 
 89. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000). 
 90. Compare Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1753–54 (2013) (suggesting that remand without vacatur can be used 
to avoid disruption when tax regulations are invalidated on APA grounds), with Patrick J. 
Smith, May Regulations that Violate the APA Be Remanded to the IRS?, 141 TAX NOTES 84, 85 
(2013) (arguing that remand without vacatur is unavailable as to tax regulations because of the 
Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421). 
 91. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
 92. See, e.g., Camp. v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139–40 (1973) (per curiam). 
 93. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (remanding 
the case to the district court for “plenary review of the Secretary’s decision,” including, if 
necessary, taking the testimony of the administrative officials who participated in the decision). 
 94. See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations 
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal 
Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 723 n.18 (1975). 
 95. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633 (1995). And not just 
American legal culture. For a discussion of cognate principles in Europe, see generally Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of 
Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99 (2007); and Martin Shapiro, The Giving 
Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (1992). 
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1. Constitutional Considerations.  Many commentators and 
judges root the reasoned-explanation requirement in the separation-
of-powers principle.96 Some view the requirement as a necessary 
condition for judicial review, allowing the courts to fulfill their Article 
III duties.97 The requirement might also be thought of as a way to 
prevent courts from exceeding their constitutional role. Giving 
reasons helps to separate value judgments (which administrators can 
legitimately make but judges cannot) from objective analysis (which 
judges can legitimately review).98 And, of course, requiring reasons 
also helps keep agencies from exceeding their constitutional roles, as 
“arbitrariness review can be seen as a substitute for the failed 
nondelegation doctrine, the former limiting agencies’ discretion in 
light of the latter’s inability to do the same.”99 
2. Political-Process Considerations.  By compelling agencies to 
give reasons and respond to objections, the reasoned-explanation 
requirement makes them disclose the relevant data, the values and 
assumptions in play, and the trade-offs entailed in the choice.100 This is 
thought to protect citizen participation in government,101 foster 
informed political dialogue,102 facilitate political accountability,103 
express the respect that government owes to its citizens,104 and put 
“less connected interest groups on the same footing . . . as more 
focused groups like the regulated industry.”105 In addition, judicial 
 
 96. E.g., Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 388; Stack, supra note 50, at 956–58. 
 97. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 98. E.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 541–42 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Orum v. Comm’r, 412 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2005); 
see Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 148.  
 99. Note, supra note 43, at 1912. See generally Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False 
Promise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 100. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 79, at 2181. 
 101. Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal 
Regulatory Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 768. 
 102. Colin Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 
414 (1981). 
 103. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 148. See generally Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and 
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009). 
 104. Cf. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public 
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 9 (1999) (offering this 
justification in support of a contention that legislatures have an obligation to explain the laws 
they enact). 
 105. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 157.  
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review provides “a crucial legitimating function in the modern 
administrative process.”106 
3. Decisional-Quality Considerations.  In theory, a reasoned 
explanation might improve the quality of agency decisionmaking. The 
doctrine might cause agencies to rethink close calls.107 And, it may 
serve a useful signaling function, identifying the need for additional 
scrutiny of agency positions that either received inadequate 
deliberation,108 or reflected political payoffs or agency capture rather 
than good public policy.109 Are such theories borne out in fact? 
Commentators disagree.110 
E. Objections to the Requirement 
Two principal objections have been lodged against explanation 
requirements, and against arbitrary-and-capricious review more 
generally. Specifically, they are thought to contribute to outcome-
driven judicial decisionmaking and regulatory ossification. These 
concerns are described below. 
1. Outcome-Driven Decisionmaking.  As noted above, one 
claimed advantage of hard-look review is that it allows courts to 
ensure that agencies did their job seriously but leaves policy decisions 
to the agencies. That is nice in theory and, no doubt, is realized in 
some instances. But a darker potential also exists. 
 
 106. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 642 (1997); see also LOUIS L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) (“The availability of judicial 
review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative 
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”). 
 107. E.g., Friendly, supra note 27, at 207–08. 
 108. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006). 
 109. E.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To 
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 510 (1997); 
Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 154, 178. 
 110. Compare Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 
239 (1973) (“I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, 
detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative 
decisions.”), with Friendly, supra note 27, at 207–08 (concluding that remands for better 
explanation have significantly improved agency decisionmaking), and Mark Seidenfeld, 
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL 
L. REV. 486, 543–48 (2002) (noting that “assessing the impact of judicial review on these 
processes requires some speculation,” but providing reasons to think that it improves agency 
decisionmaking). 
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A judge would be rightly taken to task for writing an opinion 
that forthrightly says “I am reversing because, by my constellation of 
values, the agency’s chosen outcome was unwise, unjust, and just 
plain dumb.” It is far safer for the judge to accomplish a substantive 
outcome through procedural means. For example, an opinion that 
disingenuously says “I say nothing about the substance of the 
agency’s end result; it is just that the agency used the wrong process in 
reaching that result,” is far more likely to be palatable. 
Justice Black gave voice to this concern in his Chenery I 
dissent,111 as have scholars.112 One may be forgiven for suspecting that 
such policymaking by indirection was at work in Overton Park, and 
quite probably in other cases as well.113 Scholars have studied the 
correlation of judges’ political affiliation and ideological orientation 
with their pro- or anti-agency holdings.114 In the context of review of 
IRS adjudications, such factors presumably would operate rarely. But 
another kind of subterfuge effect—sympathy for individual 
taxpayers—might rear its head. 
2. Ossification.  Ossification is a much-masticated morsel in 
administrative law. The notion is that, when courts make agencies 
jump through procedural hoops, the extent and quality of agencies’ 
regulatory efforts may suffer.115 Yet ossification is not always bad. 
Inhibiting unwise agency actions would be no loss. Ossification can be 
seen as “the price society pays for reducing agencies’ error[]” costs.116 
 
 111. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 99 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“Hypercritical exactions as to findings can provide a handy but an almost invisible glideway 
enabling courts to pass ‘from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of 
policy.’” (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941))). 
 112. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in 
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 504–07 (1985). 
 113. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls 
over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992). 
 114. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1746 
(1999); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out 
About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 24–26 & n.80 (2009). 
 115. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59, 62–66 (1995); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political 
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 300, 310. But see Jordan, supra note 89, at 403–07 (questioning the ossification 
theory). 
 116. Note, supra note 43, at 1910; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 189 (“At the 
administrative level, hard-look review plays somewhat the same role that bicameralism and 
presentment are meant to play at the legislative level.”). 
JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:15 AM 
2014] REASONED EXPLANATION 1791 
Ossification is discussed far more often in the context of 
rulemaking than in the context of adjudication.117 However, somewhat 
comparable costs could arise as to IRS adjudication. This possibility is 
explored in Part IV.A below.118 
F. Limits of the Requirement 
Reflecting the attempt to balance the benefits and costs 
described above, courts have developed a number of limitations on 
the required extent of explanation. Unsurprisingly, courts differ as to 
how they draw the contours of these limitations. The following are 
among the principal limitations. First, courts “will uphold a decision 
of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be 
discerned.”119 Accordingly, despite Chenery I, courts may accept post 
hoc explanations that “merely illuminate reasons obscured but 
implicit in the administrative record.”120 Similarly, explanation is 
unnecessary when the reason for the agency’s action is obvious.121 It is, 
after all, a hoary maxim that the law does not command performance 
of meaningless acts.122 
Second, the agency’s consideration of alternatives is not deficient 
“simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device 
and thought conceivable by the mind of man.”123 Generally, the 
 
 117. In tax, for example, fears have been expressed that greater attention to the APA’s 
rulemaking requirements would inhibit the ability of Treasury to issue guidance needed by 
taxpayers. I doubt it. See generally Steve R. Johnson, Following the APA Will Not Eliminate 
Useful Guidance, 130 TAX NOTES 128 (2011). 
 118. See infra Part IV.A. 
 119. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974); 
Casino Airlines, Inc. v. NTSB, 439 F.3d 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at 
286); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (per curiam) (“The [agency’s] explanation 
may have been curt, but it surely indicated the determinative reason for the final action 
taken . . . .”). 
 120. Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1507 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Clifford v. Pena, 77 F.3d 1414, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 121. See, e.g., Michael Asimov, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California 
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1238 (1995); cf. Sheppard v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 
756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding harmless an agency’s failure to undertake formal notice and 
comment because the agency’s substantive approach was “the only reasonable one”). 
 122. E.g., Lessinger v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 123. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
551 (1978); see, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 524–25 (9th Cir. 
1994); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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agency needs to respond only to comments it has received, and even 
then only to relevant, significant, and viable comments.124 
Third, explanation and support may not be demanded beyond 
the bounds of reason and feasibility. For example, “[t]here are some 
propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be 
marshaled . . . . It is one thing to set aside agency action under the 
[APA] because of failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be 
obtained. . . . It is something else to insist upon obtaining the 
unobtainable.”125 
Fourth, a technical breach will be excused if the complaining 
party suffered no detriment. In such cases, the harmless-error rule 
applies.126 For example, “[w]hen it is clear that based on the valid 
findings the agency would have reached the same ultimate result, [a 
court will] not improperly invade the administrative province by 
affirming.”127 
II.  IRS ADJUDICATION 
When one thinks of administrative adjudication, images of 
hearings before administrative-law judges (ALJ) or agency 
commissioners may come to mind. Such proceedings do not typify 
federal tax practice,128 but there are other kinds of agency 
adjudication. 
Tax professionals are not accustomed to thinking of the IRS as 
an adjudicatory body, but the IRS does engage in what constitutes 
adjudication in an administrative-law sense. The APA defines 
“adjudication” as an “agency process for the formulation of an 
 
 124. E.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. FERC, 494 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Career 
Coll. Ass’n v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108, 123 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 125. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009). 
 126. E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007); 
PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. 
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 127. Salt River Project Ag. Improvement & Power Dist. v. United States, 762 F.2d 1053, 
1060–61 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Consol. Coal Co. v. Smith, 837 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 
1988); cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
Chenery I’s prohibition on post hoc rationales does not apply to agency arguments offered 
under step one of Chevron analysis). 
 128. There are rare exceptions to this statement. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.1–10.9, 10.20–10.38 
(2013) (setting out hearing procedures for tax professionals subject to discipline for violation of 
rules of ethical practice before the IRS). 
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order,”129 and it defines “order” as “the whole or a part of a final 
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory 
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including 
licensing.”130 
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency 
action to be “final”: First, the action must mark the “consummation” 
of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of merely 
tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be 
one by which “rights or obligations have been determined,” or from 
which “legal consequences will flow.”131 
Under these definitions, many determinations made by the IRS 
can rightly be called adjudications. For reasons of manageability and 
principle, this Article focuses on four paradigm determinations—
deficiency, jeopardy and termination, trust fund recovery penalty, and 
CDP determinations—then briefly adverts to other types of IRS 
determinations. This Part develops these four paradigms of IRS 
adjudication. The next Part addresses whether—as a matter of 
current law and practice—the IRS explains its adjudicatory decisions 
in the context of these paradigms. 
A. Deficiency Determinations 
At one time, there was no prepayment remedy available to 
taxpayers contesting federal tax liabilities. Taxpayers had to pay the 
determined liabilities, then bring suit for refund of taxes illegally 
assessed and collected. After enactment of the modern federal 
income tax in 1913,132 however, pressure to create a prepayment 
forum became irresistible. The forum evolved from a unit within the 
then-styled Internal Revenue Bureau itself, to an independent 
administrative agency known as the Board of Tax Appeals, to the Tax 
 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012). 
 130. Id. § 551(6). Professor Alan Morrison, by reading a number of provisions in concert, 
concludes that “[u]nder the APA, any agency action that is not a rulemaking is an 
adjudication.” Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and 
Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 98 (2007).  
 131. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. 
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). 
 132. Underwood Tariff Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913). 
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Court of the United States (still an administrative agency), and finally 
to the current United States Tax Court (an Article I court).133 
The IRS lacks legal authority to assess and collect certain major 
taxes—income, estate, gift, and some excise taxes—until the taxpayer 
has had the opportunity to contest the liabilities in Tax Court.134 In 
brief, the process is as follows: First, the taxpayer files a return. 
Second, the IRS selects the return for examination. Third, if the IRS 
agent believes that correct liability exceeds liability reported on the 
return (that is, that a deficiency exists), the agent issues to the 
taxpayer a preliminary document (the Revenue Agent’s Report or 
thirty-day letter) setting out proposed adjustments. Fourth, if the 
taxpayer disagrees, she can obtain administrative review by filing a 
protest with the IRS Appeals Office. Fifth, if Appeals Office 
consideration is not requested or no resolution is reached at Appeals, 
the IRS issues a notice of deficiency (also called a ninety-day letter). 
Sixth, the taxpayer may contest the determinations in the notice of 
deficiency by filing a timely petition with the Tax Court. Seventh, if 
the taxpayer fails to file a timely petition or if the Tax Court holds 
against the taxpayer in whole or part, the IRS may then assess and 
collect the deficiency (and interest and penalties, if any).135 
The notice of deficiency represents the IRS’s final 
determination.136 It is the taxpayer’s “ticket to the Tax Court.”137 The 
taxpayer may not invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction until the notice 
of deficiency has been issued.138 The IRS Chief Counsel’s Office must 
review and approve certain notices of deficiency, including those from 
cases involving substantial deficiencies, certain penalties, complex or 
unique legal issues, or otherwise sensitive matters.139 
 
 133. The history is developed by HAROLD DUBROFF, THE TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS (1979), Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243632, and Leandra 
Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835 (2014). 
 134. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012). Statutory exceptions exist. For example, the IRS can 
immediately assess amounts reported on the taxpayer’s return and underpayments attributable 
to math errors on the return. Id. §§ 6201(a), (b)(1). 
 135. See id. §§ 6211–6215. For greater detail, see generally DAVID M. RICHARDSON, 
JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 93–133, 207–33 (2d ed. 2008). 
 136. I.R.C. § 6212(a). The taxpayer may seek reconsideration of the determinations in the 
notice, and the IRS has authority to compromise its determinations and even to rescind the 
notice. I.R.C. §§ 6212(d), 7122(a). However, agency action is final even when reconsideration is 
possible. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 145 (1993). 
 137. Comm’r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 630 n.12 (1976). 
 138. I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
 139. IRM 4.8.9.9.2.1 (July 9, 2013). 
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Income-tax liabilities arising from the operation of some 
partnerships are handled under a special regime.140 That regime 
establishes cognate rules to the deficiency procedures, requiring 
issuance of a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) 
resembling a notice of deficiency.141 The determinations in an FPAA 
may be challenged in court on a preassessment basis roughly 
comparable to Tax Court consideration of a notice of deficiency.142 
Cognate procedures also exist as to transferee and fiduciary 
liabilities, which are secondary collection mechanisms available as to 
income, estate, gift, and some excise taxes.143 Such liabilities are 
required to “be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and 
subject to the same provisions and limitations” as the taxes to which 
they relate.144 Thus, when a notice of deficiency (followed by the 
opportunity for prepayment judicial consideration) would have been 
required before assessment of the underlying tax, a notice of 
transferee (or fiduciary) liability (followed by the opportunity for 
prepayment judicial consideration) is required before assessment of 
the secondary liability for the unpaid amount. 
B. Jeopardy and Termination Determinations 
The operation of the deficiency procedures takes years. 
Normally, lack of celerity is tolerable because the IRS eventually 
collects and interest accrues throughout the period.145 But the delay 
tempts some taxpayers to hide, transfer, or dissipate their assets in 
anticipation of ultimately losing in Tax Court, rendering the IRS’s 
victory fiscally hollow. To protect the fisc when such contingencies 
materialize, the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) allows the IRS to 
shortcut the normal deficiency procedures by making immediate 
termination and jeopardy assessments followed by immediate 
collection of determined liabilities.146 
 
 140. I.R.C. §§ 6221–6255. See generally RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 161–78. 
 141. I.R.C. § 6223(a)(2). 
 142. Id. § 6226. 
 143. See Steve R. Johnson, Unfinished Business on the Taxpayer Rights Agenda: Achieving 
Fairness in Transferee Liability Cases, 19 VA. TAX. REV. 403, 406–07 (2000). 
 144. I.R.C. § 6901(a). 
 145. See id. §§ 6601, 6621. 
 146. Termination assessments are of income taxes for not-yet-ended tax years. I.R.C. § 6851. 
Jeopardy assessments are of income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes for tax periods already 
completed. Id. § 6861; see RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 184. 
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Mindful of due process implications, and to prevent the IRS from 
overreaching in using these powerful devices,147 Congress enacted 
I.R.C. § 7429.148 It requires, in addition to other internal approvals, 
that the IRS Chief Counsel’s Office approve the expedited 
assessment or levy.149 Then, the IRS must, within five days, send the 
taxpayer “a written statement of the information upon which [it] 
relied in making [the] assessment or levy.”150 
Thereafter, the taxpayer may, within thirty days, seek review by 
the IRS Appeals Office, which is required to determine the 
reasonableness of the making and amount of the assessment or levy.151 
If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with that determination, she may bring 
an action, usually in federal district court, to dispute it.152 Within 
twenty days, the district court must decide whether the making of the 
assessment or levy and the amount thereof were “reasonable under 
the circumstances.”153 This decision is “final and conclusive and shall 
not be reviewed by any other court.”154 This proceeding does not 
resolve the underlying merits. The idea is to freeze the situation to 
prevent erosion of collection protection but not to determine with 
finality the correct amount of liability. The IRS still must issue a 
notice of deficiency,155 giving the taxpayer the opportunity for a 
review by the Tax Court to determine the merits. 
 
 147. See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 185–88 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Breen v. United States, No. C81-517a, 1981 WL 1936, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 1981). 
 148. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1204, 90 Stat. 1520, 1695 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 7429). 
 149. I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1)(A). 
 150. Id. § 7429(a)(1)(B). 
 151. Id. §§ 7429(a)(2)–(3). 
 152. Id. §§ 7429(b)(1)–(2).  
 153. Id. §§ 7429(b)(3)–(4). This standard is fairly deferential to the IRS. It requires 
something more than “not arbitrary and capricious” but something less than “substantial 
evidence.” E.g., Harvey v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
 154. I.R.C. § 7429(f). Despite this language, some circuits have held that § 7429 decisions are 
appealable for limited purposes, such as whether the trial court exceeded its authority, 
improperly evaluated standing, or committed procedural errors. E.g., Morgan v. United States, 
958 F.2d 950, 951–52 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 155. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6851(b) (termination assessments); id. § 6861(b) (jeopardy 
assessments).  
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C. CDP Determinations 
Legislation passed in 1998 made over sixty IRS “reforms.”156 
Some of these changes were harmful, many were purely cosmetic, and 
a few were beneficial.157 The most significant of the 1998 changes was 
the introduction of CDP rules in I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330. The IRS 
has long possessed collection weapons more powerful than those 
available to private creditors.158 The introduction of CDP rules 
reflected Congress’s concern that the IRS sometimes wielded these 
weapons too aggressively and with insufficient sensitivity to their 
effects on the delinquent taxpayers.159 
With stated exceptions, the CDP rules kick in when the IRS files 
notice of its tax lien or before the IRS levies on property.160 They 
require the IRS to notify the taxpayer of the action, explaining “in 
simple and nontechnical terms” the amount of unpaid tax, the 
taxpayer’s right to a hearing and administrative appeal, and the rules 
governing actions the IRS intends to take.161 
Within thirty days, the taxpayer may request a hearing with the 
Appeals Office.162 At the hearing, the Appeals Officer must obtain 
verification that the IRS has followed required procedures and must 
consider nonfrivolous arguments raised by the taxpayer, including 
 
 156. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 23, 26, and 38 U.S.C.). This episode 
in the “sausage factory” is chronicled in Steve. R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic 
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 
446–57 (1999), and commented upon by Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax 
Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 271 (2009). 
 157. For a description of the changes, see generally Robert Manning & David F. Windish, 
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act: An Explanation, 80 TAX NOTES 83 (1998). 
 158. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The IRS as Super Creditor, 92 TAX NOTES 655, 655–56 
(2001). 
 159. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 44, 67 (1998); see Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, 
Addressing Imperfections in the Tax System: Procedural or Substantive Reform?, 103 MICH L. 
REV. 1423, 1441 (2005). 
  The CDP regime is controversial. Some urge its outright repeal; some suggest 
modifications; and some defend its necessity. See, e.g., 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 226–45, 451–70, 498–510 
(2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/ntafy2004annualreport.pdf; Cords, supra note 21, 
at 444 & n.91; Steve R. Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Compliance and 
Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1031, 1061 (2003). See generally Book, supra note 7; 
Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L. J. 57 
(2009). 
 160. I.R.C. §§ 6320(a), 6330(a). 
 161. Id. §§ 6320(a)(3), 6330(a)(3). 
 162. Id. §§ 6320(a)(3)(B), 6330(a). 
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spousal defenses, the appropriateness of collection actions, collection 
alternatives, and (when the taxpayer did not have previous 
opportunity to dispute them) the existence and amount of the 
underlying liability.163 The Appeals Officer’s decision is set out in a 
notice of determination.164 Within thirty days thereafter, the taxpayer 
may appeal the decision to the Tax Court.165 
In general, the IRS is precluded from taking forced collection 
action during administrative and judicial review.166 As a consequence, 
the normal statute of limitations on IRS collection activity is 
suspended during this period.167 A taxpayer who fails to timely invoke 
the CDP process may request an “equivalent hearing” at the Appeals 
Office, but collection is not suspended and judicial review is not 
available.168 
D. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Determinations 
Employers deduct from their employees’ paychecks withholding 
on federal income tax and the employees’ share of Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act taxes. Employers are supposed to pay these 
amounts (called trust fund taxes) over to the IRS at specified 
intervals.169 When employers experiencing financial difficulties fail to 
make these remittances, trying to collect from the employers would 
be futile. Thus, Congress gave the IRS a secondary collection 
mechanism: I.R.C. § 6672 allows the IRS to assert personal liability 
against “responsible persons,” that is, the principal officers and 
owners of the employer who decided not to pay the trust fund taxes 
to the IRS.170 
 
 163. Id. §§ 6320(c), 6330(c), (g). 
 164. For an example of a notice of determination, see Davis v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 35, 38 
(2000). 
 165. I.R.C. §§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(1). 
 166. Id. § 6330(a)(1). Exceptions are set out in § 6330(f). See, e.g., Burke v. Comm’r, 124 
T.C. 189, 196 (2005). 
 167. I.R.C. §§ 6320(e)(1), 6330(e)(1); see id. §§ 6502, 6503 (setting out the collection statute-
of-limitation rules). 
 168. See, e.g., Herrick v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1469 (2003). 
 169. I.R.C. §§ 3121(a), 3402.  
 170. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 384. This device is popularly known as the 
“trust fund recovery penalty,” the “responsible person penalty,” or the “100 percent penalty.” 
Actually, it is a collection device, not a penalty. The IRS is not permitted to collect and retain 
amounts in excess of the unpaid trust fund taxes. E.g., Allan v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 499, 
501 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff’d, 514 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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Before assessing § 6672 liabilities, the IRS is required to send the 
responsible person a sixty-day letter, specifying how much liability it 
has determined for each tax period.171 This gives the responsible 
person the opportunity to file a protest, triggering Appeals Office 
consideration. If the protest is timely filed, the IRS may not assess the 
liabilities until after the Appeals Office renders its final 
determination.172 If no protest is filed or the case is not resolved at 
Appeals, the IRS assesses the liability. Postpayment judicial review is 
available in district court or the Court of Federal Claims.173 
E. Other IRS Determinations 
The four paradigms just limned constitute agency adjudication as 
understood by administrative law. Each is required by statute. Each is 
consequential in the sense that its application is a prerequisite to the 
IRS’s assessment or collection of taxes.174 Each prescribes a particular 
type of written decision by the IRS. And each represents the IRS’s 
final decision after review of the preliminary conclusions of the line 
agent handling the case.175 
Other types of IRS determinations possess some of these 
attributes and arguably rise to the level of adjudication. For example, 
Professor Bryan Camp maintains that the IRS makes an adjudication 
decision every time it assesses liabilities reported on income-tax 
returns or refund overpayments claimed on such returns.176 Moreover, 
I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) provides generally that both spouses are 
responsible for liabilities as to their joint income-tax returns.177 To 
mitigate potentially harsh consequences, § 6015 relieves spouses of 
 
 171. I.R.C. §§ 6672(b)(1)–(2). 
 172. Except in jeopardy situations. The running of the statute of limitations on collection is 
suspended during the protest and administrative appeals process. Id. §§ 6672(b), (c). 
 173. Id. § 6672(c)(1). The Tax Court also can hear § 6672 issues if the CDP process is 
invoked. 
 174. In addition, such determinations sometimes have significant collateral consequences. 
For example, liabilities determined in a notice of deficiency, even though not confirmed through 
litigation, can be treated as binding in computing a convict’s eligibility for parole. Kramer v. 
Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901–02 (7th Cir. 1986), reh’g granted, 806 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7) (defining adjudication as the process for formulating the 
agency’s “final disposition”); see also Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 170 (2001) (Halpern, J., 
concurring) (stating that an IRS CDP determination “is, within the meaning of the APA, an 
‘adjudication’”). 
 176. Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457, 463–66 
(2013). 
 177. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3). 
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liability in particular circumstances.178 This Article does not 
treat § 6015 cases as a separate paradigm because, although “stand-
alone” cases are possible, spousal relief controversies usually play out 
in either the deficiency or CDP contexts. Nonetheless, there is a 
sizable body of instructive case law under § 6015, on which this 
Article will later draw.179 Similarly, if the deficiency procedures do not 
apply in a particular situation, or they would apply but the taxpayer 
chooses not to invoke them, the taxpayer can still obtain postpayment 
review by fully paying the additional tax determined by the IRS, 
timely filing a refund claim with the IRS, and, after the IRS denies or 
ignores the refund claim, timely filing a refund suit in federal district 
court or the Court of Federal Claims.180 
The IRS denies a refund claim by issuing to the taxpayer a notice 
of disallowance.181 This Article does not include such determinations 
among its paradigms because they are less consequential than a 
deficiency notice. A deficiency notice is a legal prerequisite to Tax 
Court litigation and to assessment and collection. In a refund claim 
situation, however, the IRS has already made the assessment and has 
the money. Moreover, the disallowance notice is not a prerequisite to 
refund litigation. Even if the IRS issues no such notice, the taxpayer 
may sue after six months have elapsed from the filing of the refund 
claim.182 Despite these differences, however, some might see a refund 
claim disallowance determination as an IRS adjudication. 
Other IRS determinations arguably also may be adjudications.183 
It would exhaust both author and reader to plumb the depths of all 
possible examples. However, Part V below offers some preliminary 
thoughts as to how APA–style explanation arguments might be 
handled in these other contexts. 
 
 178. Id. § 6015. 
 179. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 180. See I.R.C. §§ 6511, 6532, 7522; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). 
 181. See IRM 34.5.2.2 (Dec. 21, 2012). 
 182. I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1).  
 183. For example, I.R.C. § 7428(a)(1) provides for judicial consideration of IRS 
“determination[s]” relating to the tax status of various organizations. Section 7436(a) authorizes 
judicial consideration of IRS “determination[s]” as to the employment status of workers. 
And § 6404(b) involves IRS decisions to not abate liability for interest. 
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III.  CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE OF IRS EXPLANATIONS 
This Part considers two matters. The first and longer issue looks 
at whether and to what extent current law requires the IRS to provide 
explanations of its adjudicatory decisions. Does the IRS now have 
duties of explanation? If so, how extensive are they and what legal 
rules authorize the imposition of these duties? The second matter 
involves current practice. Whether under the goad of legal 
compulsion or simply as a matter of administrative practice, does the 
IRS give explanations of its adjudicatory determinations? If so, how 
adequate are they? 
A. The Law Governing IRS Explanations 
Currently, there is not a single rule as to required explanations 
that cuts across and operates with uniformity in all areas of IRS 
adjudication. Instead, there are multiple sources of duties of 
explanation. Judges and commentators have anchored perceived 
duties of explanation variously in tax law, the APA, or administrative 
common law. Often they have just asserted the existence of a duty but 
have not moored it in any particular law. Moreover, the relevant case 
law is thin. Some significant questions have never been settled, while 
some seemingly settled principles have recently been questioned as 
being outmoded. This Part wades into these murky waters. It orients 
the discussion around the four paradigms of IRS adjudication 
developed in Part II. 
1. Deficiency Determinations.  As described in Section II.A 
above, in some instances the IRS may not assess tax liabilities until 
the deficiency procedures have run their course. Central to these 
procedures is the issuance of a notice of deficiency. According to 
Professor Leandra Lederman, a notice of deficiency “plays three 
conceptually distinct roles in tax litigation. First, it is . . . the 
jurisdictional ‘ticket to Tax Court.’ Second, it notifies the taxpayer of 
the IRS’s determination, comparable to legal process. Third, it also 
functions as a pleading in ensuing Tax Court litigation.”184 
But deficiency notices traditionally have been conceptualized 
more narrowly. Many judges and scholars have emphasized the first 
of the above functions, seeing a notice of deficiency as “nothing more 
 
 184. Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to 
Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 203 (1996) (footnotes omitted).  
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than ‘a jurisdictional prerequisite to a taxpayer’s suit seeking the Tax 
Court’s redetermination of [the IRS’s] determination of the tax 
liability.’”185 
Perhaps reflecting that narrow view—as well as the fact that 
I.R.C. § 6212 prescribes no particular contents for a deficiency 
notice186—there is a long line of cases (starting in the 1930s) holding 
that a valid notice can have only minimal content and need not take a 
particular form.187 Under this line of cases, a notice is valid as long as 
it specifies the deficiency and identifies the tax period to which it 
relates,188 even if it contains no explanation of the basis on which the 
IRS determined the deficiency.189 
Moreover, courts typically hold that they will not “go behind” 
the notice to examine the mindset of the IRS or the procedures it 
used in the particular case.190 However, I.R.C. § 6212(a) does require 
that the IRS “determine[]” the deficiency.191 Thus, it “clearly 
contemplates” that the IRS must make “a thoughtful and considered 
determination.”192 This has given rise to limited taxpayer protective 
rules. For example, if it is clear from the face of the notice that the 
IRS did not make a considered determination as to the particular 
taxpayer, the notice is invalid.193 Alternatively, if the IRS’s 
determination is utterly without factual foundation, it is arbitrary and 
 
 185. Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Stamm Int’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 248, 252 (1985)). 
 186. E.g., United States v. Lehigh, 201 F. Supp. 224, 232 (W.D. Ark. 1961). 
 187. E.g., Comm’r v. Forest Glen Creamery Co., 98 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1938); see, e.g., 
Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937) (“[T]he notice is only to advise the person 
who is to pay the deficiency that the [IRS] means to assess him; anything that does this 
unequivocally is good enough.”). 
 188. E.g., Foster v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 34, 229–30 (1983), aff’d in part, 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 
1985); Jarvis v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 646, 655–56 (1982). 
 189. E.g., Abrams v. Comm’r, 787 F.2d 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1986); Abatti v. Comm’r, 644 F.2d 
1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Comm’r, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969); Comm’r v. 
Stewart, 186 F.2d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 1951). 
 190. E.g., Estate of Brimm v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 15, 23 (1978); Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974). 
 191. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012). 
 192. Couzens v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1159 (1928); see also In re Terminal Wine Co., 1 
B.T.A. 697, 701 (1925) (“By its very definition and etymology the word ‘determination’ 
irresistibly connotes consideration, resolution, conclusion, and judgment.”).  
 193. The key case is Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). In Scar, the 
notice disallowed deductions from a tax shelter the taxpayers had not participated in and from 
which their return claimed no deductions. Id. at 1365. The IRS conceded that the notice was 
erroneous. Id. The court emphasized, however, that application of this principle would be rare. 
Id. at 1367 n.6. 
JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:15 AM 
2014] REASONED EXPLANATION 1803 
capricious.194 This strips the notice of the presumption of regularity to 
which the IRS normally is entitled and shifts the burden of proof to 
the IRS.195 
Even under the strikingly indulgent principles above, deficiency 
notices sometimes were invalidated because they were inadequately 
explained. On those rare occasions, however, the basis of the 
explanation duty was seen as a matter of federal tax law—that is, as a 
construction of the term “determine[]” in I.R.C. § 6212(a)—rather 
than as a construction of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or any other feature of 
general administrative law.196 
The landscape was altered by the enactment of I.R.C. § 7522 in 
1988.197 It provides that for any IRS notice to which the section 
applies, the IRS is required both to identify the amounts of liability it 
has determined and to state “the basis” for the determination.198 This 
requirement applies to notices of deficiency, postassessment notices 
and demands for payment, notices generated by IRS information-
return matching programs, and revenue agent reports (thirty-day 
letters).199 
Section 7522 “does not articulate specific standards for 
determining whether the description of the Commissioner’s basis is 
adequate.”200 Interpreting this section, courts have reached three 
conclusions. First, the notice must contain enough information to 
allow the taxpayer to craft a meaningful Tax Court petition 
challenging the notice.201 Second, § 7522 does not require the IRS to 
identify the statutory provisions supporting the adjustments in the 
 
 194. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 442 (1976). 
 195. Ruth v. United States, 823 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). Again, this rule operates 
only in “rare cases,” that is, “[i]n certain quite limited circumstances.” Id. 
 196. E.g., United States v. Lehigh, 201 F. Supp. 224, 232–34 (W.D. Ark. 1961). 
 197. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6233, 102 
Stat. 3342, 3735 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7522 (2012)). 
 198. I.R.C. § 7522(a). 
 199. Id. § 7522(b). The Senate bill would have applied the direction more broadly, and the 
Conference Committee stated: “Although the provision is limited to the specified notices, the 
conferees expect the IRS to make every effort to improve the clarity of all notices and 
explanations that are sent to taxpayers.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, pt. 2, at 219 (1988) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5279.  
 200. Shea v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 183, 196 n.20 (1999), nonacq., 2000-44 I.R.B. 430. 
 201. Caldwell v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 38, 49 (2011), aff’d, 483 F. App’x 847 (4th Cir. 2012).  
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notice.202 Third, the IRS does not have to set out the factual bases of 
its determinations.203 
Section 7522 imposes an obligation of explanation on the IRS 
but no judicial remedy if the IRS fails to meet that obligation. It 
provides: “An inadequate description . . . shall not invalidate such 
notice.”204 Yet violation of § 7522 is not costless to the IRS. Taxpayer 
complaints may catch the ear of Congress. Moreover, the Tax Court 
has held that, when the IRS violates § 7522, the burden of proof on 
the issue can shift to the IRS.205 Thus, even without judicial 
enforcement, the IRS has reasons to take § 7522 seriously. 
One commentator questions the continuing vitality of the above 
cases in light of State Farm and other APA case law, finding § 7522 to 
be insufficient protection for taxpayers.206 He proposes that a level of 
APA reasoned-explanation analysis be added to existing dimensions 
of judicial review of deficiency determinations. In addition, some 
judges have supported applying APA judicial-review standards to 
deficiency cases involving equitable spousal relief.207 
Courts often apply a type of harmless-error analysis to uphold 
explanations of less than ideal clarity. They do so in cases in which the 
taxpayer received additional information from other sources more or 
less related to the IRS notice, such that the taxpayer was not 
prejudiced. There are similar cases involving explanatory challenges 
to notices of deficiency,208 although they are fewer in number. 
 One category of deficiency litigation deserves particular 
attention. The IRS has elaborate review mechanisms to promote 
decisional consistency. Nonetheless, because of changed views of law 
 
 202. E.g., Wheeler v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 200, 205 (2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 203. E.g., Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 105, 113 (2009), aff’d, 613 F.3d 1360 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
 204. I.R.C. § 7522(a). 
 205. Shea, 112 T.C. at 197; see also Ludwig v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 961, 963 (1994) 
(suggesting that, in appropriate cases, courts might shift the burden of proof to the government 
when the IRS violates § 7522(a)); cf. Sellers v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 135, 138–39 (2000) 
(considering whether the government should bear the burden of proof, but concluding that the 
notice of deficiency was nonetheless adequate).  
 206. See generally Smith, supra note 15. 
 207. See supra note 16. 
 208. See, e.g., Bitker v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 72, 78–79 (2003) (evaluating a notice of 
deficiency issued to partners in light of explanations set out in IRS notices issued to his 
partnership); see also TAX CT. R. 160 (establishing a harmless-error rule under which the Tax 
Court “at every stage of case will disregard any error or defect which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties”). 
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or policy or simply because of the volume of cases it handles, the IRS 
sometimes takes a position in one case that is, or appears to be, 
incompatible with positions it took in prior cases or in published 
guidance. 
A substantial body of case law has grown up in this area, but the 
doctrine is in shambles. Numerous views have been offered in the 
cases and commentary, but no settled rule exists.209 Many cases say 
that there is no judicially enforceable duty of consistency on the 
IRS,210 but many other cases say there is.211 
Authorities supporting the existence of a judicially enforceable 
duty often are vague about the legal basis for the duty.212 Borrowing 
from general administrative law, Professor Lawrence Zelenak has 
proposed that the IRS be bound to its prior position unless, in the 
later case, it explains why the positions are consistent or why its later 
view is better than the view it is repudiating.213 Professor Zelenak 
suggests three main possible sources for such a duty: agency-specific 
(that is, tax) statutes, administrative common law, or the APA 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard.214 One candidate statute is 
I.R.C. § 7805(b), which allows the IRS to prescribe the extent to 
which tax rulings “shall be applied without retroactive effect.”215 
 
 209. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblins of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an 
IRS Duty of Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317, 318–19 (proposing imposition of a “duty of 
consistency” on IRS actions against taxpayers); Timothy Jacobs, Barnes Group: Tax Court 
Turns Blind Eye to Ravenhorst, 140 TAX NOTES 481, 481 (2013) (arguing that a recent Tax 
Court decision permitting the IRS to argue against revenue rulings is “unworkable”); Steve R. 
Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and Proposed 
Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 567–68 (2010) (suggesting that taxpayers should be 
able to show reliance on “high-level Treasury or IRS positions” that are “later contradicted or 
disregarded”). 
 210. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72–76 (1965) (holding that the IRS may 
retroactively withdraw an acquiescence in Tax Court rulings); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1936) (agreeing with lower courts that an amended Treasury 
regulation governs stock transaction). 
 211. See, e.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
Commissioner may not retroactively abrogate a ruling in an unclear area with respect to any 
taxpayer who has relied on it.”); Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374, 377–78 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that taxpayers may argue “administrative inconsistency”). 
 212. See, e.g., Vesco v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101, 129–30 (1979) (ruling against the IRS 
in a deficiency case for disparate treatment of differing taxpayers but not explaining from where 
such a duty of consistency comes). 
 213. Zelenak, supra note 15, at 412 (citing DAVIS, supra note 15, § 8.9, at 198).  
 214. Id. at 413–14 & n.14. In extreme cases of invidious discrimination, he adds a fourth 
possible source, the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
 215. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2012). Courts have construed this section as creating a 
presumption in favor of retroactivity but allowing taxpayers to challenge retroactive 
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However, most of the inconsistency cases do not root their result in 
that section. Moreover, the zest with which some courts once 
deployed administrative common law has been chilled by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.216 
That leaves the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as the best 
foundation for a duty of the IRS to explain or repudiate. If (a big 
“if”) the cases imposing a consistency duty are right, their best hope 
for a sound mooring is in the reasoned-explanation requirement. 
2. Jeopardy and Termination Determinations.  The IRS must, 
within five days of making a jeopardy or termination assessment or 
levy, provide the taxpayer “a written statement of the information 
upon which [it] relied in making such assessment or levy.”217 The 
object “is to give the taxpayer notice of the information on which the 
government relies so that the taxpayer may raise any available 
defenses.”218 
The principal grounds justifying a jeopardy or termination 
assessment are that collection is imperiled because the taxpayer 
either appears to be hiding himself; appears to be hiding, transferring, 
or dissipating his assets; or is insolvent.219 As the cases cited below 
show, several decades ago, five-day notifications sometimes just 
parroted these conditions without giving any supporting details or, 
even worse, just said, in words or effect, “you are acting in ways that 
imperil collection.” Such statements are insufficient to meet the 
underlying purpose of the notification requirement.220 
 
applications on an abuse-of-discretion standard. E.g., Manocchio v. Comm’r, 710 F.2d 1400, 
1403 (9th Cir. 1983); Lesavoy Found. v. Comm’r, 238 F.2d 589, 593–94 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 216. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978); see id. at 543 (instructing lower courts not to impose on agencies procedural 
requirements beyond those in the APA and enabling acts absent “constitutional constraints or 
extremely compelling circumstances”). 
 217. I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1)(B). 
 218. Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v. United States, No. 78-1984-CIV-WMH, 1979 WL 1333, at 
*2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1979). 
 219. I.R.C. § 6851(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6851-1(a) (as amended in 1978), 301.6861-1(a) (as 
amended in 1995), 301.6862-1(a) (as amended in 1982). Many courts have also considered 
additional circumstances, especially criminal activity by the taxpayer. See, e.g., Albury v. United 
States, Nos. 88-0788-CIV-RYSKAMP, 88-0789-CIV-RYSKAMP, 1988 WL 125768, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 9, 1988) (“[A]n indication that a taxpayer is engaged in criminal activity is significant 
in assessing whether the taxpayer is likely to conceal his assets.”).  
 220. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006) (refusing to accord deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of a regulation that merely parroted the statutory language). 
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Two lines of cases arose with respect to insufficient § 7429 
statements. In the first line, courts that were initially indulgent of 
conclusory notifications became increasingly frustrated by the IRS’s 
practice of continuing to issue such notifications despite judicial 
rebuke. They asserted that jeopardy and termination assessments 
could be abated because of inadequately explanatory five-day 
notifications,221 they threatened to order such abatement should 
violations persist,222 and they sometimes actually did order 
abatement.223 
These cases did not make clear the basis upon which the courts 
claimed authority to invalidate assessments for inadequate 
explanation. Presumably, as in the cases invalidating deficiency 
notices for inadequate explanation, the basis was in the interpretation 
of the applicable tax statute, here, § 7429(a)(1)(B). 
In these cases, however, there are occasional hints that 
administrative-law principles may also have been at work. In one 
case, the IRS sought to justify its termination assessment on the 
grounds that the taxpayer was attempting to conceal both himself and 
his assets.224 The court refused to consider these grounds because they 
were not set out in the five-day notification.225 This is black-letter 
administrative law under Chenery I,226 but it is bad tax law.227 Thus, 
either the court misunderstood tax law, or it was glossing tax law with 
administrative law. Another case compared the § 7429 reasonableness 
 
 221. See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding 
that omission of IRS conclusions from a termination notice “would be fatal to that 
assessment”); Berkery v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (acknowledging that a 
mere letter announcing a termination agreement would be insufficient notice, but concluding 
that the IRS provided the taxpayer with sufficient documentary support); Barry v. United 
States, 534 F. Supp. 304, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that a threadbare statement that the 
taxpayer’s gambling warranted a termination assessment would constitute invalid notice but 
that the government provided various enclosures tying it to the taxpayer’s gambling records in 
this case). 
 222. See, e.g., DeLauri v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 442, 444–45 (W.D. Tex. 1980) 
(reasoning that the taxpayer’s refusal to provide information counseled against abatement but 
that it would be necessitated by inadequate IRS notice in future proceedings). 
 223. See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (abating a 
jeopardy assessment when the IRS notice was “completely bare” of supporting information). 
 224. Hirschhorn, 662 F. Supp. at 891. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 227. It is settled that in a § 7429 review proceeding, the court may consider all relevant 
grounds and information, whether known when the assessment was made or discovered only 
later. E.g., Loretto v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 1168, 1173–74 (E.D. Pa. 1977); S. REP. NO. 94–
938, at 364–65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3793–94. 
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standard to two APA standards. It concluded that the § 7429 standard 
is somewhat more demanding than “arbitrary[] [and] capricious” 
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), but somewhat less demanding than 
“substantial evidence” under § 706(2)(E).228 
Cases of the second line are considerably more numerous. They 
found conclusory five-day notifications to be insufficient but refused 
to invalidate them. These cases applied a harmless-error approach—
although they cited neither 5 U.S.C. § 706 nor any other source of a 
harmless-error rule.229 The cases excused defective explanations 
because the taxpayers suffered insufficient prejudice. The information 
omitted from the five-day notifications was received by the taxpayers 
by way of either informal production before the hearing, formal 
discovery before the hearing, or prior proceedings against the IRS.230 
3. CDP Determinations.  Although there are differences, CDP 
bears similarities to the jeopardy-and-termination regime just 
discussed. First, at least in theory,231 as to most issues, the CDP 
standard of proof is deferential: abuse of discretion as to CDP232 and 
reasonableness as to jeopardy and termination assessments and 
levies. 
Second, as seen in the preceding Section, jeopardy-and-
termination review is not limited to the record made by the IRS. 
Similarly, the Tax Court claims the ability to go outside the record in 
CDP cases, although this ability is controversial.233 One can 
 
 228. Loretto, 440 F. Supp. at 1172. 
 229. E.g., Hagaman v. United States, No. CIV-1-90-75, 1990 WL 86017, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 10, 1990); Revis v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (D.R.I. 1983). 
 230. E.g., Hagaman, 1990 WL 86017, at *1; Revis, 558 F. Supp. at 1076. 
 231. The Tax Court and generalist courts often use the same words but are animated by 
different spirits in applying them. Abuse-of-discretion review in the Tax Court is notably stricter 
than such review in the district and circuit courts. See, e.g., Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 155 
(1st Cir. 2012), rev’g 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1653 (2011) (“[A] court cannot be expected to conduct 
the same level of judicial review that would follow, say, a bench trial or a more formal agency 
proceeding.”); see also Cords, supra note 21, at 441 (explaining the basis for using different 
standards of review). 
 232. E.g., Jones v. Comm’r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003). Some circuits are even more 
deferential: “[L]est the judiciary become involved on a daily basis with tax enforcement details 
that Congress intended to leave with the IRS.” Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
 233. E.g., Robinette, 439 F.3d at 459–62, rev’g 123 T.C. 85, 96–104 (2004). See generally 
Christine K. Lane, On-the-Record Review of CDP Determinations: An Examination of Policy 
Reasons Encouraging Judges To Stick to the Administrative Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 
149 (2007).  
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understand the temptation to go outside the record because it often is 
sparse in CDP cases.234 However, “Congress knew about the 
incomplete nature of the record that would be available”;235 taxpayers 
often are the ones responsible for record gaps because they failed to 
provide information requested by the IRS;236 and “[i]t is a basic 
principle of administrative law that review of administrative decisions 
is ‘ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the 
agency . . . and of the evidence on which it was based.’”237 
Third, as seen in Part III.A.2, some courts in the jeopardy-and-
termination context asserted the power to invalidate assessments and 
levies when the IRS notification failed to explain the bases of the 
IRS’s determination. Similarly, courts in CDP cases have often found 
notices of determination to be inadequately explanatory, 
necessitating remand to the Appeals Office.238 In practical terms, CDP 
remand and jeopardy-and-termination invalidation have much the 
same effect. Remand stops the IRS’s intended collection action, but 
the IRS will later be able to proceed if it develops a satisfactorily 
reasoned explanation. Similarly, when its first jeopardy or 
termination assessment or levy is invalidated, the IRS can make a 
second one, hopefully to be adequately explained in the new five-day 
notification. 
 
 234. In CDP review there is no obligation to conduct a face-to-face hearing, no formal 
discovery, and no requirement for testimony, cross examination, or a transcript. The hearing 
usually consists of informal oral and written communication between the taxpayer and the IRS. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2)A-D6 (as amended in 2006). 
 235. Dalton, 682 F.3d at 156. 
 236. E.g., Olsen v. Comm’r, 414 F.3d, 144, 149, 151 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 237. Robinette, 439 F.3d at 459 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714–15 (1963)). And, outside the APA context, when 
Congress provides for judicial review without defining its scope and procedures, normally 
“consideration is to be confined to the administrative record.” Bianchi, 373 U.S. at 715. 
 238. E.g., Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, No. CIV-A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280, at *4–5 
(D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2000), nonacq., 2001-2 C.B. 176; Salahuddin v. Comm’r, No. 7050-11L, 2012 
WL 1758628, at *7 (T.C. May 17, 2012); Leago v. Comm’r, No. 13070-08L, 2012 WL 407493, at 
*9 (T.C. Feb. 9, 2012); Fairlamb v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 1103, 1107 (2010); Hoyle v. 
Comm’r, 131 T.C. 197, 204–05 (2008); Oman v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M (CCH) 372, 375–76 (2006). 
  The IRS agrees that remand is appropriate when the appeals officer “failed to make 
necessary findings of fact” or “failed to perform an analysis that is necessary in making the 
determination” and when “the administrative record contains no indication of the documents or 
evidence the officer considered in making the determination or the reasons for the 
determination.” I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice 2004-031, Litigating Cases Brought Under I.R.C. 
§§ 6320(c) and 6330(d) (2004), available at http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irs-ccdm/2004/
cc-2004-031.pdf. 
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Fourth, in the CDP situation, as in the jeopardy-and-termination 
situation, it is unclear on what authority the courts relied in 
fashioning their remedies. The CDP courts ordering remand did not 
invoke the APA, but neither did they assert any other basis of 
authority. Some courts did cite Chenery I in discarding rationales not 
stated in the notice of determination.239 
This matter is unlikely to be settled as long as a more 
fundamental difference between the Tax Court and some generalist 
courts remains unresolved. The Tax Court has declared: “[W]hen 
reviewing for abuse of discretion [for CDP purposes], we are not 
limited by the [APA],”240 a view rejected by some generalist courts.241 
The Tax Court took a similar position as to equitable spousal relief 
under I.R.C. § 6015.242 
Part of the Tax Court’s rationale is that the APA does not apply 
to courts,243 and the Tax Court is a court.244 Right premises, wrong 
conclusion. The Tax Court surely is a court.245 Indeed, its predecessor, 
although formally an administrative agency, was “in its essentials 
practically a court of record” as far back as 1924.246 But that is beside 
the point. The APA is law that is applied by a court when reviewing 
 
 239. E.g., Salahuddin, 2012 WL 1758628, at *7; see Fairlamb, 99 T.C.M (CCH) at 1106–07 
(using the Chenery I principle but not citing the case by name); cf. Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 
1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting Chenery I but rejecting the taxpayer’s argument based on it). 
 240. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
Despite being reversed in Robinette, the Tax Court clings to its view. E.g., Oropeza v. Comm’r, 
95 T.C.M (CCH) 1367, 1369 (2008). 
 241. E.g., Robinette, 439 F.3d at 461; Olsen, 414 F.3d at 155. 
 242. See Ewing v. United States, 122 T.C. 32, 37–38 (2004) (“[T]he APA does not apply to 
deficiency cases in this Court . . . . We see no material difference between [equitable spousal 
relief under § 6015] and [deficiency cases] . . . .”), rev’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 243. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (2012). 
 244. E.g., Robinette, 123 T.C. at 96; Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972). Surprisingly, 
some have accepted, or nearly accepted, this misguided analysis. E.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 
F.3d 980, 990 n.16 (9th Cir. 2013). Despite the above protestation, the Tax Court has applied the 
APA in some situations. E.g., Mailman v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 1079, 1082–83 (1988); Estate of 
Gardner v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 989, 994 (1984); Dittler Bros. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 896, 909–10 
(1979), aff’d, 642 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981).  
 245. E.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 890–91 (1991); see Steve R. Johnson, The 
Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court 
Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 280–82 (1998). 
 246. See DUBROFF, supra note 133, at 66 (reprinting President Calvin Coolidge’s signing 
statement of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336, creating the Board of 
Tax Appeals). Nonetheless, the formal status of the Tax Court was an agency, not a court, at the 
time the APA was enacted. See generally Malvern B. Fink, Note, Effect of the Administrative 
Procedure Act on Decisions of the Tax Court, 2 TAX L. REV. 103 (1946). 
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agency action, not law applied to the court. The question is not 
whether the Tax Court is exempt from the APA, but whether the IRS 
is.247 
The true roots of the Tax Court’s reluctance are cultural. 
Throughout its existence, the Tax Court has been accustomed to 
conducting de novo proceedings. The Article III federal courts are far 
more familiar with APA–style review. This difference in experience is 
reflected in other aspects of the Tax Court’s often less-than-stellar 
treatment of administrative law, such as its foot-dragging on accepting 
the standard of review set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council Inc.,248 its embrace of the government’s 
benighted understanding of the difference between legislative and 
interpretive regulations,249 and its turning of supposedly deferential 
review into virtual de novo review in many cases.250 
4. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Determinations.  The explanatory 
adequacy of sixty-day letters has not thus far been subject to 
substantial litigation.251 Somewhat similar issues have been raised as 
to another part of the § 6672 regime, however, and courts’ treatment 
of these issues suggests that they will behave in the § 6672 area in like 
fashion to how they behave in other IRS adjudication contexts.252 
After the IRS has assessed § 6672 liabilities, I.R.C. § 6203 
provides that the assessed person is entitled, upon request, to receive 
 
 247. E.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 n.5 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 248. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see, e.g., 
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 129–31 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 249. E.g., Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 26–28 (1983). For description of the government’s 
understanding of the distinction and why that understanding is wrong, see Steve R. Johnson, 
Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law, 112 TAX NOTES 773, 780–81 
(2006). 
 250. See, e.g., Book, supra note 7, at 1194–97; Cords, supra note 21, at 445. 
 251. The current regime was enacted in 1996. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 
§§ 901–903, 110 Stat. 1452, 1465–67 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6672 (2012)). A 
§ 6672 target raised the sixty-day-letter issue in one case, but the court properly did not consider 
it because the relevant events happened before the 1996 effective date. United States v. Long, 
No. 4:CV-97-1432, 1999 WL 250737, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1999). In another case, the 
assessed person failed to raise the adequate-reasoning argument at trial, jeopardizing his ability 
to advance it on appeal. See Brief for the Appellee at 20, Nakano v. Comm’r, No. 12-70992 (9th 
Cir. Aug. 22, 2012), 2012 WL 3835216, at *20. 
 252. Although limited law exists on the point, there may be at least one difference. As seen 
in Part III.A.1 above, the Tax Court has held that inadequate explanation can shift the burden 
of proof to the IRS in the deficiency contest. A district court has refused to do so in the § 6672 
context. Curley v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 52, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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a copy of the record of assessment from the IRS. This consists of the 
summary record and supporting records providing “identification of 
the taxpayer, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable 
period . . . and the amount of the assessment.”253 This is all required 
by the statute and regulations. 
Targets sometimes have complained that the information 
provided by the IRS contained defects or omissions, requiring 
invalidation of the assessment.254 In such cases, “[g]enerally courts are 
liberal in finding that an assessment has been properly made and 
technical defects are ignored in the absence of prejudice.”255 In some 
cases, there was no prejudice because the erroneous or missing 
information was inconsequential256 or was not required by statute or 
regulation.257 In other cases, there was no prejudice because the 
assessed person received the missing information through other 
means.258 Beyond the question of prejudice, some courts stated or 
implied that notice defects, categorically, cannot invalidate an 
otherwise proper assessment.259 
There are two lessons here. First, one way the target can receive 
the missing information is through prior proceedings.260 This fits 
the § 6672 situation. Under that section, the IRS seeks to impose 
secondary liability on responsible persons of companies that do not 
meet their obligations.261 The IRS’s actions against their companies 
 
 253. I.R.C. § 6203; Treas. Reg. § 301.6203-1 (1967). 
 254. See, e.g., Howell v. United States, 164 F.3d 523, 524 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing the 
district court decision for the assessed person); Attick v. United States, 904 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D. 
Conn. 1995) (denying the government’s motion for summary judgment initially, but then 
granting the motion after the IRS provided additional information). 
 255. In re Dewberry, 158 B.R. 979, 982 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (citing Planned Invs., Inc. 
v. United States, 881 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 256. E.g., Conway v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 209, 217 (2012). 
 257. E.g., Allan v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 499, 504 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff’d, 514 F.2d 1070 
(5th Cir. 1975); see Curley v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 52, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“It appears 
that the IRM guidelines were not followed. However, . . . the provisions of the IRM are not law 
and do not create any substantive rights in [the assessed person].”). 
 258. E.g., Anuforo v. Comm’r, 614 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2010); Curley, 791 F. Supp. at 56. 
 259. Howell, 164 F.3d at 526. 
 260. Cf. Evans v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 1118, 1125 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that a 
taxpayer failed to show prejudice when, although a jeopardy assessment might have been 
inadequate on its face, the taxpayer had notice of the information obtained from discovery in 
four pending criminal indictments); Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v. United States, No. 78-1984-
CIV-WMH, 1979 WL 1333, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1979) (holding that the taxpayer had actual 
notice by virtue of a similar jeopardy-assessment case as to a transferee of the taxpayer’s). 
 261. I.R.C. § 6672 (2012). 
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typically provide target owners and officers with substantial 
information bearing on their potential § 6672 liabilities. 
Second, Chenery I—a bedrock of administrative-law reasoned-
explanation analysis—applies weakly here. The target unsuccessfully 
made a Chenery-like argument in one § 6672 case.262 This lack of 
success is unsurprising. Many cases noted above allowed the IRS to 
remedy initial imprecisions and omissions by subsequent disclosure. 
This harmless-error approach largely swallows Chenery I in this 
context. 
B. The Practice of IRS Explanations 
This Section advances two conclusions. First, IRS determinations 
usually provide meaningful explanation. Second, however, courts 
have varied widely in the detail they demand of agency explanations 
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Accordingly, it is 
possible, indeed likely, that some IRS determinations would be 
invalidated if the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement were held 
to be applicable to IRS adjudications. 
1. Current Level of Explanation.  A 1976 Tax Court case stated: 
Here, we have a vague notice of deficiency, that is, a notice of 
deficiency in which the [IRS] makes a determination that may be 
based on any one of a number of grounds but in which [it] fails to 
advise the taxpayer of the grounds on which [the IRS] relies. For 
years, such notices of deficiency have created problems in 
proceedings in this Court.263 
Similarly, “[c]ommentators have long complained about the 
inadequacy of the explanation portion of many statutory notices.”264 
But most such complaints preceded 1988. The IRS received wakeup 
calls in 1987 in Scar v. Commissioner265 and in 1988 in I.R.C. § 7522,266 
and the quality of its explanations has improved. 
 
 262. See Howell v. Rogers, 164 F.3d 523, 525 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting a taxpayer’s 
argument that supporting documents as to the § 6203 record must have been prepared 
contemporaneously with the assessment). 
 263. Estate of Allensworth v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 33, 34 (1976). 
 264. Lederman, supra note 159, at 224; see also Mary Ferrari, “Was Blind but Now I See” 
(Or What’s Behind the Notice of Deficiency and Why Won’t the Tax Court Look?), 55 ALB. L. 
REV. 407, 437–45 (1991) (discussing cases). 
 265. Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 266. For discussion of Scar and § 7522, see supra Part III.A.1. 
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The Internal Revenue Manual sets out procedures for IRS 
personnel drafting notices of deficiency.267 Deficiency notices contain 
several components. First is a letter stating the taxpayer’s name and 
address, the type of tax, the tax period, and the amount of the 
deficiency plus any penalties asserted. The letter also informs the 
taxpayer of the availability of Tax Court review. Next in the 
deficiency notice is a waiver form for taxpayers who wish to forgo Tax 
Court by consenting to immediate assessment. This is followed by a 
listing of the adjustments determined by the IRS along with a 
recomputation of tax liability based on the adjustments, accompanied 
by one or more pages explaining, in one or more paragraphs per 
adjustment, why each adjustment is being made.268 These explanatory 
paragraphs have two purposes: first, “[t]o inform the taxpayer in clear 
and concise language of the adjustments,” and second, “[t]o state the 
position or positions of the IRS with respect to the adjustments.”269 
Poorly explained notices of deficiency sometimes sneak through IRS 
review processes, but the frequency of this failure has declined. 
A similar story can be told about jeopardy- and termination-
assessment notices. Part III.A.2 above rehearsed the case law as to 
the explanation of such determinations.270 Overwhelmingly, the cases 
explained in this section are from the 1970s and 1980s. The increased 
care with which the IRS has prepared notices of deficiency since 1988 
has spilled over into how the IRS prepares jeopardy and termination 
notifications. 
The situation as to CDP determinations remains mixed, 
however. In many cases, such determinations are amply explained.271 
In other cases, unfortunately, the same cannot be said.272 
 
 267. IRM 4.8.9.8–4.8.9.9 (July 9, 2013).  
 268. E.g., Straight v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1457, 1461–62 (1997), rev’d, No. 23658-94, 
1999 WL 33587419 (T.C. May 6, 1999).  
 269. IRM 4.8.9.8.6 (July 9, 2013). 
 270. See supra Part III.A.2.  
 271. E.g., Jackson v. United States, No. Civ-06-643-D, 2010 WL 1372486, at *4 (W.D. Okla. 
Mar. 31, 2010) (finding that the notice of determination analyzed each of thirteen potentially 
relevant considerations); Bennett v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 319, 321 (2008) (noting that the 
IRS “has diligently presented an exhaustive narrative to justify [its] conclusion”). 
 272. E.g., Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280, at *4 (D. 
Colo. Nov. 21, 2000) (explaining that the notice of determination included “no statement of 
facts, no legal analysis, and no explanation of how or why the proposed levy balanced the need 
for collection with [the taxpayer’s] interests,” but instead contained a mere “blank recitation of 
the statute”), nonacq., 2001-2 C.B. 176. 
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2. Comparison to APA Explanation.  “Arbitrary and capricious” 
is flexible language. The spirit in which the standard is applied 
matters more than the verbal formulation. As seen in Part I.B, courts 
vary in the degree of detail and specificity they require. Thus, one 
could reasonably expect that, were an APA–style reasoned-
explanation requirement to be applied to IRS adjudications, some 
courts would find the level of explanation that now prevails to suffice, 
but others would not. 
For example, assume that the taxpayer claimed loss deductions 
on account of XYZ tax shelter and the IRS disallowed the deductions 
because the shelter lacked economic substance. Under current law, in 
cases “to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant,” the 
taxpayer prevails only by showing both that the transactions changed 
the taxpayer’s economic position “in a meaningful way” independent 
of tax savings and that the taxpayer had a “substantial,” tax-
independent purpose for entering into the transaction.273 Various 
special rules modify, define, or clarify these general requirements.274 
In a notice of deficiency in the above situation, what level of 
specificity would be needed to satisfy the reasoned-explanation 
requirement? There are multiple possibilities: First, the notice might 
say: “Your loss deductions claimed as a result of XYZ are disallowed 
because you have not established that XYZ had economic 
substance.” This would give notice of the adjustment and the 
conclusion on which the adjustment is based. Second, the notice 
might say the above and then add: “You have not shown that the 
economic substance doctrine is not relevant to this situation. You also 
have not shown that the transaction had a meaningful economic effect 
and/or that you had a substantial non-tax purpose for entering into 
the transactions.” This would give notice of the adjustment, the 
conclusion on which it is based, and the subsidiary conclusions that 
are the elements of the main conclusion. Third, the notice might state 
all of the above and then add specific findings of fact under one or 
more of the subconclusions. Fourth, the notice might state all of the 
above and add conclusions and findings of fact as to the special rules. 
If a court held the first or second version satisfactory, there 
would be little change from what prevails under existing tax 
explanation requirements. Requiring the third or fourth version 
would be a major change, and would invalidate many notices of 
 
 273. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2012). 
 274. Id. §§ 7701(o)(2)–(5). 
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deficiency. In all likelihood, different judges would choose different 
versions. At least one commentator has predicted that the application 
of an APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement would lead to 
more taxpayer successes.275 Depending on the level of specificity 
reviewing courts require, that prediction could prove correct.276 
IV.  REASONED EXPLANATION AS TO  
DEFICIENCY DETERMINATIONS 
This Part considers whether it would be desirable to engraft an 
APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement onto IRS deficiency 
determinations, and whether it would be permissible to do so within 
the existing state of the law. Such an engrafting would be neither wise 
nor permissible under existing doctrine. 
A. Policy Considerations 
Parts I.D and I.E rehearsed the principal advantages and costs of 
requiring reasoned explanations. This Part considers those 
advantages most relevant to the notice-of-deficiency context and also 
explores related considerations. 
1. Possible Advantages.  Part I.D noted the constitutional, 
political-process, and decisional-quality benefits offered as 
justifications for the reasoned-explanation requirement. However, 
many of these benefits are more applicable to agency regulations—
which involve policy discretion and are subject to deferential 
review—than to IRS notices of deficiency, which involve adjustments 
to statutory rules and are subject to de novo review. For example, 
there is little doubt that in making determinations of tax liability, the 
IRS operates within the role assigned to it by Congress. In addition, 
courts are less likely to stray outside their role when applying defined 
statutory rules than when passing on value-laden regulatory choices 
made by agencies. Political-process values are more obviously at 
stake in the quasi-legislation of agency rulemaking than in 
individualized tax liability determinations. And information 
 
 275. Smith, supra note 15, at 343. 
 276. For an example of explanatory paragraphs in the notice of deficiency, how a taxpayer 
suggested they should have been written, and how the court chose between the proffered 
alternatives, see Elliott v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 13, 16–19 (2001), aff’d, 54 F. App’x 413 
(5th Cir. 2002). 
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asymmetries in the latter context favor the taxpayer (who participated 
in the transactions at issue) rather than the IRS. 
A robust explanation requirement might promote good 
ossification if it caused the IRS to abandon bad positions earlier in 
the process. This would save taxpayers time, money, fear, and 
frustration. However, the possibility of losing at trial—a genuine 
possibility under a de novo standard of review—hopefully provides 
adequate incentive to the IRS to sharpen its thought processes and to 
avoid setting up bootless adjustments.277 
It sometimes is argued that the loose tax explanation regime 
“encourages—even rewards—vagueness and imprecision 
in . . . deficiency notices.”278 However, the explanatory quality of 
notices of deficiency appears to have improved, not deteriorated, in 
recent decades. The various institutional costs of vagary described 
earlier279 appear to be sufficient disincentives. 
In short, tax law already contains tax-specific explanation rules. 
Little would be gained by adding to them a possibly more robust 
explanation requirement. Shifting the burden of proof to the IRS—
already possible280—is a better-calibrated response. 
2. Possible Costs.  As seen in Part I.E, concerns about 
explanation requirements include fears of results-oriented 
adjudication and administrative ossification. The first of these 
concerns probably would not be significant in tax adjudications. 
Courts occasionally have sought to massage flexible doctrine to favor 
sympathetic taxpayers.281 However, most courts steel themselves to 
the harshness that sometimes arises from technically correct 
 
 277. Moreover, the IRS risks the shifting to it of the taxpayer’s legal fees and other expenses 
if it takes a substantially unjustified position at trial. I.R.C. § 7430. 
 278. Shea v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 183, 208 (1999) (Beghe, J., concurring), nonacq., 2000-44 
I.R.B. 430. 
 279. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 281. For example, I.R.C. § 7403 allows the IRS to seek judicial sale of property in which a 
tax delinquent has an interest. Courts have limited equitable discretion to refuse to make such 
sales. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 703–11 (1983). In sympathetic cases, district courts 
sometimes abuse that limited discretion and have to be reined in. E.g., United States v. Winsper, 
No. 3:08CV-631-H, 2010 WL 3829408 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010), rev’d, 680 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
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application of the tax laws,282 so problems in our contexts likely would 
remain within tolerable bounds. 
Bad ossification could occur, however, along with other 
problems if an APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement was 
superimposed upon notices of deficiency. The potential costs of such 
an approach are described below. 
a. Resources.  Evaluating the adequacy of the explanations in 
IRS notifications of deficiency is a preliminary exercise to the main 
contest: deciding the merits in the de novo Tax Court or refund 
litigation. At some point, the investment of time, money, and effort in 
preliminary exercises becomes excessive for the IRS, the courts, and 
the taxpayers themselves.283 Deficiency determinations, after all, are 
informal, not formal, adjudications under the APA.284 For, judicial 
review that is too exacting, especially on preliminary matters, “would 
defeat the very purpose of . . . informal procedures before the 
agency—saving time and effort in cases not worth detailed formal 
consideration or not requiring a hearing on the record.”285 
Legal process should be administered with a sense of 
proportion.286 The IRS audit rate already is quite low,287 which 
contributes to a tax gap that is quite high.288 Time taken to write or 
rewrite notices to satisfy exacting explanation requirements would be 
time that could not be devoted to auditing more returns.289 
 
 282. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is not a feasible 
judicial undertaking to achieve global equity in taxation . . . . And if it were a feasible judicial 
undertaking, it still would not be a proper one, equity in taxation being a political rather than a 
jural concept.”); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967) (“[T]here is no 
equity in tax law.”); Speltz v. Comm’r 124 T.C. 165, 176–77 (2005) (citing cases rejecting 
challenges based on equity), aff’d, 454 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 283. E.g., Clapp v. Comm’r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 284. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 285. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 742–43 (1985). 
 286. See, e.g., Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 2012) (“In the exercise of 
powers of judicial review, one size does not fit all.”). 
 287. Currently, the IRS audits only about one out of every hundred returns filed, only about 
one-fifth of the audit rate in the 1990s. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 95. 
 288. The IRS estimates that about $450 billion of taxes that should have been paid have not 
been. Tax Gap “Map” Tax Year 2006, IRS (Dec. 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
tax_gap_map_2006.pdf. 
 289. The sheer number of deficiency notices adds to the concern. The IRS issued slightly 
over 352,000 such notices in fiscal year 2012, of which only about .04 percent were challenged in 
Tax Court. 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2012 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 n.43 (2012), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/
userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-2.pdf. 
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b. Role of the Courts.  The role of the courts must also be 
considered in assessing the costs of such an approach. Congress 
charged the IRS, not the courts, with administering the I.R.C. In the 
CDP and deficiency contexts, courts have warned about approaches 
to review under which “the judiciary will inevitably become involved 
on a daily basis with tax enforcement details that judges are neither 
qualified, nor have the time, to administer.”290 
A jeopardy assessment/levy case illustrates this danger. In 
Fidelity Equipment Leasing Corp. v. United States,291 contrary to usual 
practice, a court imposed elaborate conditions on the parties, 
assuming essentially a supervisory role.292 Predictably, this approach 
failed, and the court was forced to retreat to essentially upholding the 
assessment and levy.293 Subsequent courts have not repeated this 
error. 
Too exacting a review of explanations in deficiency notices 
would risk such embroilment. Especially when de novo review is in 
the offing, courts should confine preliminary review to broad strokes 
rather than attempt to micromanage. 
c. Horizontal Equity.  When a court remands a regulation 
because of inadequate explanation, all persons potentially subject to 
the regulation are similarly affected. There may be different practical 
consequences, but all are in formally the same position. In contrast, 
IRS deficiency adjudications are individualized affairs. All taxpayers 
are subject to the same statute, but case-by-case application creates 
the possibility that similarly situated taxpayers may be treated 
differently. 
Part III.B.2 noted the likelihood that different judges would use 
varying levels of rigor in applying an APA–style reasoned-
explanation requirement to deficiency determinations.294 Thus, there 
would be times when a notice of deficiency would be invalidated in 
 
 290. See Living Care Alts. of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 631 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(writing in the CDP context); see also Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(stating in the deficiency context that “courts should avoid oversight of the [IRS’s] internal 
operations and the adequacy of procedures employed”). 
 291. Fid. Equip. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ga. 1978), vacated 
in part, No. C78-1811A, 1981 WL 1755 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 1981). 
 292. Id. at 851–52. 
 293. Fid. Equip. Leasing Corp. v. United States, No. C78-1811A, 1981 WL 1755, at *9 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 12, 1981). 
 294. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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one case while, in another case, a notice of no better explanatory 
quality would be upheld. Considering the frequency of deficiency 
litigation, such disparate outcomes would be inevitable. This result 
would contravene horizontal equity, an important goal of our tax 
system.295 
d. Decisional Accuracy.  It sometimes happens that the IRS 
Examination Division fails to recognize the best theory for a 
particular adjustment or even misses legitimate adjustments entirely 
during an audit. As a result, these theories and adjustments are not 
included in notices of deficiency. The appropriate theories or 
adjustments are discovered later by the government’s lawyer before 
trial. Under current law, the government is allowed to raise the new 
theory or adjustment in an answer or amended answer, as long as the 
taxpayer is not seriously prejudiced thereby.296 If the new item alters 
the original deficiency or requires different evidence, the burden of 
proof will be on the IRS. Otherwise, the burden will (typically) 
remain on the taxpayer.297 
The IRS’s ability to raise such new matters can be important to 
accurately determining tax liability. For instance, in one case the 
taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court with respect to approximately 
$16,000 of liability determined in the deficiency notice. However, IRS 
counsel identified, raised, and won a new issue, resulting in the 
taxpayer being liable for approximately $1,025,000.298 Would the IRS 
still be able to raise such new matters in an APA–style reasoned-
explanation environment? Strict application of the Chenery I 
principle299 might suggest a negative answer, which would undermine 
decisional accuracy. 
 
 295. E.g., Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Ogiony v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 14, 18 
(2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J., concurring). But see generally James R. Repetti & Diane M. Ring, 
Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012) (maintaining that horizontal equity 
lacks normative content and should be understood as part of vertical equity). 
 296. See TAX CT. R. 41(a) (allowing liberal amendment of pleadings in the interest of 
justice). 
 297. Id. 142(a)(1); see Carlebach v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 1, 14 (2012). 
 298. Raskob v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 1283, 1283 (1938), aff’d sub nom. Du Pont v. Comm’r, 
118 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1941); cf. Trans Miss. Corp. v. United States, 494 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 
1974) (claimed refund of $78,000 turned into an additional liability of over $370,000 as a result 
of a new item raised by the government).  
 299. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
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e. Revenue Effect.  As shown in Part I.C above, the typical 
remedy for an insufficient explanation is remand to the agency. 
However, many notices of deficiency are issued at or near the end of 
the statute-of-limitations period for assessing liabilities.300 If the 
limitations period continues to run in remand situations, the IRS will 
often be time-barred from assessing legitimate liabilities. 
Normally, the running of the limitations period is tolled by the 
issuance of a deficiency notice,301 but there is doubt as to whether an 
invalid notice effects tolling. On harmless-error grounds, some cases 
have allowed tolling when there is only a technical defect in the notice 
and the taxpayer is not prejudiced.302 But other cases have held that 
invalid notices did not suspend the running of the limitations period.303 
Some courts say categorically that “[a]n invalid notice of deficiency 
does not suspend the running of the period of limitations for 
assessment.”304 Thus, there is a substantial chance that notices held 
invalid for inadequate explanation would be found not to suspend the 
running of the limitations period.305 Were this to be the case, adoption 
of a stricter explanation rule would come at a heavy cost to revenue. 
B. Legal Necessity 
As shown in Part IV.A, the policy arguments against stricter 
explanation requirements for IRS deficiency determinations outweigh 
the policy arguments in their favor.306 But policy, although relevant, is 
not dispositive. Even an unfortunate regime must be obeyed as long 
as it is the law.307 Thus, this Section asks whether stricter 
requirements, even if unfortunate, nonetheless are compelled by law. 
 
 300. Unless an exception applies, the IRS must assess additional liabilities within three years 
of the later of when the return was filed or when it was due to be filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2012); 
see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 60 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1995); Stallard v. United States, 12 
F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 301. I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1). 
 302. E.g., St. Joseph Lease Capital Corp. v. Comm’r, 235 F.3d 886, 888–92 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 303. E.g., Mulvania v. Comm’r, 769 F.2d 1376, 1380–81 (9th Cir. 1985); Weber v. Comm’r, 46 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1568, 1570 (1983); Reddock v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 21, 27–28 (1979), acq., 1979-2 
C.B. 1. 
 304. Napoliello v. Comm’r, 655 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Shockley v. 
Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1451, 1456 (2011), rev’d, 686 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
 305. See Smith, supra note 15, at 345 (taking this view). 
 306. See supra Part IV.A. 
 307. Cf., e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 746 (1985) (stating that the 
rule adopted “must of course be governed by the intent of Congress and not by any views we 
may have about sound policy”). 
JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:15 AM 
1822 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1771 
It concludes that they are not, and that there are powerful reasons to 
believe that the law precludes the application of such requirements in 
the context of IRS deficiency determinations. 
There are two principal legal obstacles to applying the APA–
style reasoned-explanation analysis to tax deficiency cases: first, the 
general APA standards are preempted by the specific, de novo 
deficiency review procedures, and second, application of the APA 
standard would contravene I.R.C. § 7522, a conflict the APA does not 
countenance. These obstacles are developed below. 
1. Preemption.  For tax traditionalists, this is not an open 
question. The standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 are available to a 
“reviewing court.”308 Over a half century ago, the Fourth Circuit 
declared in O’Dwyer v. Commissioner309 that “the Tax Court, rather 
than being a ‘reviewing court’, within the meaning of [the APA] 
reviewing the ‘record’, is a court in which the facts are triable de 
novo . . . . [T]he Tax Court is not subject to the [APA].”310 Many other 
judges have been equally emphatic in subsequent cases.311 
But the matter is hardly settled. O’Dwyer has been criticized as 
being “premised on a now outmoded understanding” of 
administrative law.312 And the notion that the Tax Court (or, in a 
refund action, the district court or Court of Federal Claims) is not a 
“reviewing court” is debatable. When the court decides a case 
involving a notice of deficiency, an ordinary-meaning approach would 
surely see the court as reviewing the notice.313 The contrary approach 
 
 308. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  
 309. O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959).  
 310. Id. at 580. 
 311. E.g., Bratcher v. Comm’r, No. 96-3877, 1997 WL 334976, at *2 (7th Cir. June 5, 1997); 
Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 37 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006); 
cf. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 105 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (making a similar argument 
in the context of disciplinary proceedings brought under securities laws); ASG Inds., Inc. v. 
United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1234 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (citing O’Dwyer in making the same 
argument regarding the former U.S. Customs Court). In a 2013 unpublished order, the Tax 
Court reaffirmed its adherence to O’Dwyer in rejecting an APA-based challenge to the 
sufficiency of explanations in a notice of deficiency. QinetiQ U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 
14122-13, at 2–3 (T.C. Dec. 27, 2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 312. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Ewing, 122 T.C. at 61 
(Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting) ( “[T]he continuing relevance of the APA discussion in 
O’Dwyer is dubious at best.”). But see Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 131 & n.3 (2008) 
(Thornton, J., concurring) (defending O’Dwyer). 
 313. Indeed, even judges sympathetic to the O’Dwyer view sometimes describe Tax Court 
deficiency proceedings as “review.” E.g., Ewing, 122 T.C. at 52 (Thornton, J., concurring). 
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is based on the idea that, to be a reviewing court, the court must be 
confined to the administrative record. But it seems unduly narrow to 
say that a court cannot be a reviewing court just because it is 
empowered to hear evidence that the agency did not consider.314 
Although there are substantial arguments on both sides, the 
traditional view is preferable: de novo review of deficiency notices 
should preclude the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious review of such 
notices. As shown below, the traditional view, although not 
compelled by the plain language of the APA, is the better 
construction of the statute. 
a. Statutory Text.  Many APA provisions are suggestive, but none 
are dispositive, as to the preemption question. First, 5 U.S.C. § 554 
defines procedures governing agency adjudication, but it excludes 
from its reach all matters “subject to a subsequent trial of the law and 
the facts de novo in a court.”315 The legislative history of the APA 
confirms that the Tax Court’s review of deficiency notices falls within 
this exception.316 However, § 554 governs formal agency adjudication, 
and IRS adjudication is informal. 
Second, 5 U.S.C. § 559 states that the APA rules “do not limit or 
repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise 
recognized by law.”317 The de novo nature of the Tax Court’s review 
of deficiency determinations has been recognized law since well 
before 1946.318 However, saying that APA rules do not limit or repeal 
the de novo rules does not conversely say that the de novo rules limit 
or repeal APA rules, which is the question at hand. 
Third, 5 U.S.C. § 703 provides: “The form of proceeding for 
judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to 
the subject matter in a court specified by statute . . . .”319 Tax Court 
litigation is the special statutory review proceeding specified for 
deficiency determinations under I.R.C. § 6213.320 However, to say that 
 
 314. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 996 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Tax Court is a ‘reviewing court’ for purposes of the judicial review provisions of the 
APA.”). 
 315. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1) (2012). 
 316. See H.R .REP. NO. 79-1980, at 45 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 28 (1945).  
 317. 5 U.S.C. § 559. 
 318. E.g., Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 598 (1931); Blair v. Oesterlein Mach. Co., 17 
F.2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1927). 
 319. 5 U.S.C. § 703.  
 320. I.R.C. § 6213(a).  
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this is the form of the proceeding does not define the contents of the 
proceeding. In this way, 5 U.S.C. § 703 does not foreclose the 
possibility that § 706 standards could be employed as part of the 
proceeding.321 
Fourth, 5 U.S.C. § 704 states that judicial review extends to 
“[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action 
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”322 “[T]he 
primary thrust of § 704 was to codify the exhaustion [of 
administrative remedies] requirement,” but § 704 “also makes it clear 
that Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA 
to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action.”323 In 
various nontax cases, the availability of express, adequate remedies 
has been sufficient reason to reject APA remedies.324 Similar 
reasoning—although not always specifically linked to the APA—has 
sometimes appeared in tax cases.325 In our context, however, no 
duplication of procedures would be necessary. The same Tax Court 
or refund proceedings that are available now would still be used. The 
court would just have an additional option: invalidating the deficiency 
notice for explanatory insufficiency without needing to reach the 
substantive merits of the adjustments in the notice. 
Fifth, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) allows “[t]he reviewing court” to “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” 
found deficient under any of six standards, one being the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard,326 another being “without observance of 
procedure required by law,”327 and another being “unwarranted by 
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the 
reviewing court.”328 One possible reading is that when the Tax Court 
conducts de novo proceedings, it is not operating outside of the APA 
but instead is operating within § 706(2)(F),329 and that the six 
 
 321. See Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 54 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring) (agreeing that 
“in appropriate circumstances, [the Tax Court should] borrow principles of judicial review 
embodied in the APA”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 322. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
 323. Brown v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). 
 324. E.g., Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 325. E.g., Clapp v. Comm’r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989); Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 
1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
 326. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 327. Id. § 706(2)(D). 
 328. Id. § 706(2)(F).  
 329. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., 
dissenting); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 61 (2004) (Halpern & Holmes, J.J., dissenting), rev’d 
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standards in § 706(2) are cumulative, not exclusive.330 On this reading, 
a court considering IRS deficiency determinations could employ an 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review under § 706(2)(A) within 
the context of a proceeding that is de novo under § 706(2)(F). If this 
reading is accepted, there is no necessary incompatibility as to 
simultaneous application of the two standards. 
In short, courts often say that the de novo nature of Tax Court 
deficiency proceedings preempts arbitrary-and-capricious review, but 
none of the potentially applicable statutes command such an outcome 
by plain language. Construction is necessary, and it is to construction 
that this Article now turns. 
b. Construction.  If the statutory text does not compel an answer, 
what is the better construction? There are arguments in favor of 
allowing APA analysis to supplement traditional tax analysis. For 
example, Congress intended the APA to “cover a broad spectrum of 
administrative actions,” and the Supreme Court has held that the 
APA’s “generous review provisions must be given a hospitable 
interpretation.”331 Moreover, the Court has stressed “the importance 
of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of 
administrative action . . . . The APA was meant to bring uniformity to 
a field full of variation and diversity. It would frustrate that purpose 
to permit divergence on the basis of [mere ambiguity].”332 
However, this policy is no Procrustean bed. In the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education 
& Research v. United States,333 a unanimous Court suggested that 
context-specific deviations from general principles of administrative 
law are permissible when justification exists.334 There are reasons to 
 
on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 131 n.3 
(2008) (Thornton, J., concurring) (criticizing the view of Judges Halpern and Holmes). 
 330. E.g., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 
(1974); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
 331. Brown v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 904 (1988) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967)) (quotation marks omitted); see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 
48, 51 (1955). 
 332. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1999). 
 333. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 334. See id. at 713 (“[The taxpayer] has not advanced any justification for applying a 
[different standard] to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any other 
agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.”). 
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construe the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard as being 
inapplicable to de novo review of deficiency and cognate 
determinations. 
First, although no single APA section described above is 
conclusive, their cumulative impact should be considered. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that construction involves 
considering “the overall statutory scheme”335 to reconcile statutes, to 
“get[] them to ‘make sense’ in combination.”336 In this spirit, “[t]he 
provisions of the [APA] must be read and construed together.”337 
Read in concert, the above near-miss sections of the APA suggest a 
direction that is more felicitous to the O’Dwyer view than hostile to it. 
Second, the deficiency litigation regime has been defined 
through statutes, court rules, and case law over generations. This 
comprehensive set of rules contrasts with the generality of the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). It is a 
“well-established principle that, in most contexts, a precisely drawn, 
detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”338 Therefore, this 
comprehensive set of rules should preempt an APA–style explanation 
here. 
Third, as always, context must be considered. As seen in Part I.F, 
otherwise inadequate explanations are acceptable when it is clear 
what the ultimate result would be in the situation.339 There are areas 
in which the IRS has discretion.340 However, in deficiency cases, the 
outcome usually depends not on policy choices made by the IRS, but 
on rules established by statute or Treasury regulations.341 In most 
 
 335. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2012) (quoting Davis v. Mich. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 336. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988); see FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76–79 (D.D.C. 
2013), aff’d, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014).  
 337. O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1959). 
 338. Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 506 (2007) (quoting EC Term of Years Trust v. 
United States, 550 U.S. 429, 434 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 339. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 340. E.g., I.R.C. § 446(b) (2012) (deviations from normal accounting method); id. § 481 
(adjustments on account of changes in accounting method); id. § 1362(f)(4) (adjustments on 
account of inadvertent invalid S-corporation elections and terminations). 
 341. When the relevant provision is clear, Treasury and the IRS have “no power to amend it 
[even] by regulation.” Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936); see also Swallows 
Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 129 (2006) (“[T]he authority delegated to the 
Secretary . . . is not limitless and, if exercised improperly, may usurp the role of Congress . . . .”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). Treasury often has considerable freedom in 
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deficiency cases, therefore, arbitrary-and-capricious review should 
have limited purchase. 
2. Section 7522.  As seen in Part III.A.1, I.R.C. § 7522 requires 
the IRS to explain the basis of adjustments set out in notices of 
deficiency.342 Such explanations are less complete than explanations 
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard might require.343 
Nonetheless, Congress expressly provided that “[a]n inadequate 
description under [§ 7522] shall not invalidate [the notice of 
deficiency].”344 Short of invalidation, the Tax Court has held that 
shifting the burden of proof to the IRS is an appropriate remedy for 
violation of § 7522.345 
Section 7522’s “no invalidation for inadequate description” 
direction strongly argues against applying APA–style reasoned-
explanation analysis to IRS deficiency determinations.346 Invalidating 
a notice of deficiency because of its descriptive insufficiency would be 
precisely what Congress said that it did not want to happen. 
A possible rejoinder involves 5 U.S.C. § 559, which provides: 
“Subsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify [various 
APA sections, including § 706] except to the extent that it does so 
expressly.”347 I.R.C. § 7522 was enacted after the 5 U.S.C. § 706, and 
the former section does not refer expressly to the latter section.348 
But it would be a mistake to take the language in § 559 at face 
value. Express language is one of several devices by which previous 
legislatures attempt to entrench their work against change by later 
legislatures. But at a certain point, entrenchment becomes 
constitutionally dubious. It is fundamental that “one legislature 
 
how it writes a regulation. Once the regulation has been finalized, however, it binds the IRS and 
taxpayers alike.  
 342. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text. 
 344. See I.R.C. § 7522(a) (Any notice to which this section applies shall describe the basis 
for, and identify the amounts (if any) of, the tax due, interest, additional amounts, additions to 
the tax, and assessable penalties included in such notice. An inadequate description under the 
preceding sentence shall not invalidate such notice.” (emphasis added)). 
 345. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 346. See I.R.C. § 7522(a). 
 347. 5 U.S.C. § 559. 
 348. Compare Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 
§ 6233, 102 Stat. 3735, 3735 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7522), with Administrative 
Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
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cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”349 Thus, a 
prescription indicating that a later enactment can have effect only if it 
expressly refers to the APA is of questionable legitimacy.350 
Accordingly, despite occasional overly exuberant remarks in 
some cases,351 language such as that in § 559 does not create an 
absolute rule of law but operates only as a “background canon[] of 
interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware.”352 A later 
statute may overcome an entrenchment attempt “either expressly or 
by necessary implication.”353 A “fair implication” in the later statute 
can suffice.354 Specifically, in Marcello v. Bonds,355 the Supreme Court 
refused “to require Congress to employ magical passwords in order to 
effectuate an exemption from the [APA],” and it held that a later 
statute impliedly exempted deportation hearings from APA 
procedures despite § 559’s “expressly” language.356 
The necessary, fair, indeed inescapable implication of 
I.R.C. § 7522 is that Congress does not want notices of deficiency to 
be invalidated because of explanatory shortcomings. Congress’s 
intent trumps 5 U.S.C. § 559 and defeats the possible application of 
the APA’s reasoned-explanation analysis to IRS deficiency 
determinations. 
V.  REASONED EXPLANATION AS TO OTHER IRS DETERMINATIONS 
For the reasons set out in Part IV above, the case is quite strong 
for not applying the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement to 
deficiency determinations. The balance of considerations is different 
as to other types of IRS adjudication, however, resulting in different 
levels of confidence and even different conclusions. 
 
 349. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810). 
 350. See generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in Tax Law, 62 
ADMIN L. REV. 1011 (2010). 
 351. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting) 
(“Exceptions to the APA may not be inferred, but must be express . . . .”). But see Robinette v. 
Comm’r, 439 U.S. 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (taking a less committal view of the matter). 
 352. Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see 2 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.1, at 772 (4th ed. 2002) (“The 
majority [opinion in Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999),] . . . seemed to establish a 
presumption in favor of uniformity in standards for judicial review of agency actions that can be 
overcome only by ‘clear’ evidence in support of a departure.”). 
 353. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908). 
 354. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 n.10 (1974). 
 355. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). 
 356. Id. at 310. 
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A. Jeopardy and Termination Determinations 
The § 7522 argument, which, as shown, is strong in the deficiency 
context, appears at first blush not to apply in jeopardy and 
termination situations. Jeopardy and termination notifications are not 
among the vehicles listed in § 7522(b), and, unlike the deficiency 
procedures that date back to the 1920s, § 7429 was enacted in 1976,357 
thirty years after the enactment of the APA. 
Could an argument be made, however, that § 7429 is so linked to 
the deficiency process that it is within the penumbra of § 7522? The 
spousal relief rules of § 6015 were enacted in 1998358—although a 
predecessor of § 6015 had roots in the 1970s. Nonetheless, some 
judges have stated that § 6015 is part and parcel of the deficiency 
process and, therefore, should be viewed as outside the reach of the 
APA.359 
But that approach has been criticized even in the § 6015 
context,360 and such an argument would be even more of a stretch in 
the jeopardy-and-termination context. Spousal relief decisions under 
§ 6015 are part of the process of determining liability, as are 
deficiency determinations. As seen in Part II.B, jeopardy and 
termination decisions do not determine liability. They merely freeze 
the status quo to preserve collection potential should the IRS 
eventually prevail. The merits of the liability determination come 
later, in independent Tax Court or refund proceedings. 
Despite the unavailability of a § 7522 argument, the balance of 
considerations favors not applying APA–style reasoned-explanation 
analysis to IRS jeopardy and termination assessments. First, the 
extraordinary need for expedition in jeopardy and termination cases 
makes adding an extra level of procedure unwise. Second, there is 
little need for the addition of a new analysis. The IRS’s issuance of 
large numbers of notifications merely parroting the statutory 
language is a practice that is decades in the past. Should the bad old 
 
 357. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 1204(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1695 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 7429 (2012)). 
 358. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, 
§ 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6015). 
 359. E.g., Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 
32, 52 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 360. E.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting); 
see Ewing, 122 T.C. at 64 n.11 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting) (“[W]e emphatically do not 
agree that sec. 6015 is ‘part and parcel’ of the ‘specific statutory framework for reviewing 
deficiency determinations . . . .’” (quoting id. at 52 (Thorton, J., concurring))). 
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days return, courts have established a context-specific explanation 
duty,361 rendering an APA explanation duty unnecessary. Third, when 
courts choose not to invoke that tax-specific duty, it is because the 
taxpayer suffered no substantial prejudice.362 The harmless-error rule 
is a recognized exception to the APA’s reasoned-explanation 
requirement.363 In the area of IRS adjudication, the rule has been 
applied most often in jeopardy and termination cases, and it serves 
well in this context. It would be wrong to exempt all IRS 
adjudications from reasoned-explanation analysis based on blanket 
assertion of harmless error. Harmless error is a narrow rule to be 
applied on a case-by-case basis rather than categorically,364 and this is 
how it has been used in the jeopardy-and-termination context. 
B. CDP Determinations 
1. Collection Issues.  Collection is involved in most issues in CDP 
hearings, such as whether the IRS has taken the right procedural 
steps for collection and whether less harsh collection alternatives 
exist. The balance of considerations favors allowing APA–style 
reasoned-explanation analysis for CDP collection issues. 
The legal arguments counseling a different outcome in the 
deficiency context do not operate as to CDP collection issues. The 
CDP regime was added to the I.R.C. in 1998.365 CDP notices of 
determination are not mentioned in § 7522, and CDP was a distinct 
innovation, not part and parcel of the deficiency process.366 Harmless-
 
 361. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text.  
 362. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 38, 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 364. See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009) (warning against “the use of 
mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment” in 
reviewing the harmless-error framework the Federal Circuit applied to decisions by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs); Sugar Cane Grower Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 
96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting a broad harmless-error claim that “would have us virtually repeal” 
a part of the APA, and adding that “an utter failure to comply with [an APA requirement] 
cannot be considered harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that failure”). 
Some moderation of the traditional rule may be developing. See, e.g., Shinseki, 565 U.S. at 411 
(acknowledging that “courts may sometimes make empirically based generalizations about what 
kinds of errors are likely, as a factual matter, to prove harmful”); Smith, supra note 38, at 1729 
(observing that, although case-by-case inquiry has been the norm, patterns of application have 
started to develop). 
 365. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 366. Cf. supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
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error analysis is far less prominent in CDP than in jeopardy-and-
termination review. 
At the level of policy, as seen in Part IV.A.2.e, one major 
concern in the deficiency context is that invalidation of the notice of 
deficiency on explanation grounds would leave the IRS unable to 
proceed because of expiration of the statute of limitations on 
assessment. But CDP collection issues arise after the tax already has 
been assessed, and the IRS has ample time to effect collection: at 
least ten years.367 Moreover, the scope of IRS discretion typically is 
greater in collection than in deficiency contexts. 
In short, neither legal compulsion nor policy exigencies operate 
in CDP collection determinations to the degree they do in deficiency 
determinations. As to collection issues in CDP, there is insufficient 
warrant to depart from broad and uniform application of the APA. 
2. Liability Issues.  Liability issues sometimes are considered at 
CDP hearings. Section 6015 spousal relief issues may be considered, 
as well as the merits of the underlying liabilities “if the person did not 
receive any statutory notice of deficiency . . . or did not otherwise 
have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.”368 This context 
presents a weaker case for preemption of APA analysis than does the 
deficiency determination context, but a stronger case for this analysis 
than does the CDP collection issues context. Revenue exigencies do 
not operate strongly because CDP hearings come after the tax 
already has been assessed. 
Perhaps most compelling is the incongruity that would exist were 
deficiency decisions under CDP to be treated more favorably for 
taxpayers than deficiency decisions outside of CDP. For example, in 
one case, the IRS properly sent a sixty-day letter (notifying the 
taxpayer of § 6672 liability) to the target’s home.369 There, it was 
signed for by the target’s twenty-three-year-old son, who (in the best 
tradition of adolescence) threw the letter “somewhere” in the 
basement instead of giving it to his father.370 The court held that the 
target had not had a prior opportunity, so it allowed him to contest 
the § 6672 merits in the CDP hearing.371 The Tax Court also has held 
 
 367. I.R.C. § 6502(a) (2012).  
 368. Id. §§ 6330(c)(2)(A)(i), (B). 
 369. Lepore v. Comm’r, No. 11698-11L, 2013 WL 2359486, at *1 (T.C. May 30, 2013). 
 370. Id. at *4. 
 371. Id. at *5. 
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that taxpayers who allegedly overstated their liabilities on the returns 
they filed can dispute those liabilities in CDP hearings.372 
If the APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement were to 
apply to liability issues in CDP hearings—but not in the normal 
deficiency process—parents of irresponsible offspring would have 
greater procedural protections than parents of responsible offspring. 
And taxpayers who file inaccurate returns and then enter the CDP 
process would have greater protections than those in deficiency and 
refund proceedings. It would be fairer to subject taxpayers to the 
same procedures whether their liability issues are contested in 
deficiency proceedings, refund proceedings, or CDP hearings. For, as 
shown in Part IV, the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement 
should not be applied to liabilities determined in deficiency cases, 
neither should it be applied to liabilities in CDP hearings. This 
approach would result in two sets of rules being applied in the same 
CDP case: the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement would apply 
to collection issues but would not apply to liability issues in the same 
CDP case. But this result would be tolerable.373 
C. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Determinations 
Explanations in sixty-day letters present yet another 
concatenation of considerations. Section 6672 is actually a collection 
device,374 a fact that normally diminishes the need to preempt APA 
analysis. However, § 6672 liability must be assessed before it can be 
collected. The IRS must assess § 6672 liabilities against the 
responsible persons within three years of the filing of the return that 
has given rise to the unpaid liability.375 That being so, the statute-of-
limitations-based concern about loss of revenue from reasoned-
explanation remands would operate in the § 6672 context. This 
concern—coupled with the infrequency of complaints about 
inadequately descriptive sixty-day letters and the existence of a 
harmless-error line of cases in the area—should tip the balance 
against applying APA–style reasoned-explanation requirements to 
sixty-day letters. 
 
 372. Montgomery v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 1, 2 (2004), acq., 2005-2 C.B. 1152. 
 373. A different split rule, distinguishing between liability and collection issues, already 
exists in the CDP context. CDP liability decisions are reviewed de novo, whereas CDP 
collection decisions are reviewed deferentially. E.g., Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000). 
 374. See supra note 170. 
 375. See supra note 300.  
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D. Other IRS Adjudications 
The considerations discussed in Parts IV and V might be useful 
in resolving questions about the application of explanation 
requirements to IRS adjudications outside the four paradigms 
explored in this Article. The case for such application is likely to be 
stronger in collection than in liability contexts and in situations in 
which a statute of limitations imposes no special need for expedition. 
In contrast, the case for application is likely to be weaker when a 
long-established and carefully detailed tradition of rigorous review 
exists, when the IRS has little discretion in applying the substantive 
rules, when skimpy explanations are likely to be harmless, when tax-
specific explanation rules already operate with some vigor, or when a 
practice of substantial explanation already prevails. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators, including Professors Kristin Hickman and 
Leandra Lederman, have rightfully decried the tendency of tax 
professionals to consider “tax law an island, apart from all other 
bodies of law.”376 But our objection should be to mindless calls for 
parochial difference. The tradition of American administrative law is 
sensitivity to context, not straitjacketing or lock-step conformity. 
Reflecting this tradition, this Article has considered whether 
reasoned-explanation analysis under the APA’s arbitrary-and-
capricious standard should be added as a further level of review of 
IRS adjudicative decisions. The Article concludes that this would be a 
bad idea for deficiency determinations and would probably be a bad 
idea in the contexts of jeopardy and termination determinations, trust 
fund recovery penalty determinations, and CDP liability 
determinations. Nevertheless, it would be a good idea for CDP 
collection determinations, and, pending particularized analysis, might 
be a good idea as to some other types of IRS adjudications. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that there are many difficult 
issues in reconciling the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement 
 
 376. Lane, supra note 233, at 166; see also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let 
Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (noting the “myth 
that tax law is somehow different from other areas of the law”); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need 
for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1542 
(2006) (arguing that “tax does not have, has never had, and should not have its own unique 
deference tradition”); Lederman, supra note 184, at 183 (describing the tendency as “tax 
insularity”). 
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with IRS adjudication. But the issues relating to them are one part of 
scores, probably hundreds, of areas of potential controversy that arise 
from the recent short-run marriage of tax and administrative law. To 
paraphrase Glen Campbell, there’ll be a load of compromisin’ on the 
road to our tax horizon377 before these newlyweds gradually, 
sometimes painfully, learn the principles of successful cohabitation. 
 
 
 377. Cf. GLEN CAMPBELL, Rhinestone Cowboy, on RHINESTONE COWBOY (Capitol 
Records 1975). 
